Department
of Political Science
Kurdish Political Enclaves: 1920-75
February 16, 1999
Key Issues in Kurds'
Struggle
Filed at 6:36 a.m. EST
By The Associated Press
Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan's futile search for a new base and his
return to Turkey mark a new chapter in the Kurdish conflict. Some key facts
about the Kurdish problem:
Q: Who are the Kurds and how many are there?
A: There are 20 million to 25 million Kurds spread out in Turkey, Syria, Iran
and Iraq. About 12 million live in Turkey, most in the poor southeastern
region. Kurds share a common language, related to Iran's Farsi, and are
overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims.
Q: What is the legal status of Kurds in Turkey?
A: Kurds are not recognized as a minority -- unlike Greeks, Armenians,
Assyrians and Jews. Recognized minorities have the right to teach in
their respective languages.
Q: What rights do Kurds have in Turkey?
A: A ban imposed by Turkey's last military government on the use of Kurdish in
unofficial settings was lifted in 1991, but Kurdish is illegal in broadcasts,
educational or political settings. A court case to ban Turkey's main
pro-Kurdish party is under way.
Q: When did the Kurdish independence movements begin?
A: Kurds were promised a homeland in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which carved up
Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the
founder of modern Turkey, fought to regain the land, destroying plans for a
Kurdish state. There have been numerous
Kurdish revolts since.
Q: When was the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, created and what are its aims?
A: The PKK was established in 1978 and turned to armed struggle in 1984.
Originally fighting for independence, the group now says it aims for an
autonomous Kurdish state or a federation with Turkey.
Q: What's the toll of the conflict?
A: Close to 37,000 people have died. The PKK has waged a guerrilla war in the
southeastern mountains and carried out attacks in western Turkey and Europe.
Q: What's the likelihood of the PKK's survival after its leader's capture?
A: Ocalan's capture is a major blow for the PKK. The group might fall into
internal conflicts and face a leadership problem. More radical activists might
opt for intensifying the armed struggle. Moderates might choose to concentrate
on a political solution.
Q: How does Turkey answer accusations that it discriminates against Kurds?
A: Turkey insists that Turks and Kurds are equal and points to success stories
of Kurds, including late President Turgut Ozal and Parliament Speaker Hikmet
Cetin.
=========================================================================================================================================
by: Ahmed H. El-Afandi*
The
Kurds are considered to be Aryans, ethnically. Until the second millennium B.C.
they were a herding nomadic group. They moved from the Caucus Mountains to
Northern Iraq, Southeastern Turkey and Western Iran but they remained separate
from other tribal groups in the area. When the Arabs occupied Iraq during the
Islamic expansion in the seventh century of Christianity, they called this group
the Kurds. Despite their conversion to Islam and participation in the
Arab/Islamic history, especially their contributions during the Crusades with
their leader Saladin, they retained their distinct character and language. They
did not mix with the Moguls during their invasion of Baghdad and usurpation of
the Abbaside Empire in the Thirteenth Century. During the Ottoman-Safawi wars,
most of the Kurds fought on the side of the Ottomans. After the latter's
victory they exercised limited control over the area inhabited by Kurds,
leaving its leaders to continue running it as before, in return for payment of
taxes and contributing soldiers to fight the Empire's enemies. After the defeat
of the Ottomans at the hands of the Egyptians in Homs and Aleppo, Iraqi Kurds
declared insurrection and declared their independence in a limited area. But in
1836 the Kurdish insurrection was put down. In 1877, the Kurds renewed their
insurrection with assistance from Tsarist Russia. But after an agreement with
Russia, the Sultan was able to put down the insurrection once again. During
World War I, The Kurdish fighters fought on the side of the Ottomans against
the Russians. But when the defeat of the Ottomans appeared eminent, some of the
Kurdish leaders contacted the British to gain the support of the allies for
Kurdish independence after the war. Following the War, the Treaty of Sevre
(1920) stipulated the creation of a three member committee, to be appointed by
Britain, France, and Italy, to draft a proposal for an autonomous Kurdistan in
the area where the Kurds constitute a majority east of the Euphrates River and
up to the Syrian-Turkish border. The inhabitants were granted the right to
declare independence, if they wished, from Turkey and informing the League of
Nations of that within a year of the implementation of the Treaty. But the
arrival of Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk" on the scene in Turkey put a stop
to implementation of the agreement to grant the Kurds independence. The Treaty
of Lausanne of 1923 did not make any mention of the independence project.(1)
The
Kurdish nationalist movement in its earlier manifestations was dominated by two
primary factors: tribal identification and the preeminence of the Sufi
movement. The movement was originally a tribal affair which took on a religious
flavor to further its legitimacy among the masses. Since the 1960's it took on
an increasingly ethnic characteristic. In the earlier years the support was
based on religious legitimacy. Since the 1960's the support for the movement
has been more secular and has appealed to intellectual groups on the basis of
ethnic identity. Communism found appeal among the Kurdish population from the
beginning of the Iraqi Communist Party in 1934. Large numbers of Kurds made up
the bulk of the ICP membership as a protest move against the status of the
region.
The
Kurds had enlisted in the Iraq Levies, a force made up largely of Assyrian and
Kurdish recruits and British officers during the First World War. They
entertained the prospect of gaining control over all of the territory of
Ottoman Kurdistan except those territories reserved for an Armenian state, as
promised to them by the British in 1922. Sheikh Mahmoud's forces controlled
Sulaymaneyya between 1922 and 1924 when the British violently pushed them out. Sulaymaneyya
was to witness further violence in 1930 and in 1931 at the hands of the Barzani
forces. The strong sentiment among the Kurds for a national state was
frustrated by the victory of Turkish nationalists at the end of the war. The
latter did not wish to see a separate Kurdish state in the region. The Kurds
had composed the majority of the population of the former Mosul Vilayet and
Sulaymaneyya was their intellectual center. From there they gained access to
the Ottoman military service.
Sheikh
Mahmoud, a Sufi leader of the Qadiri order and member of the Barzinji family of
Sulaymaneyya, was the first Kurdish leader to voice opposition to the British
authorities in Iraq. He later protested against the Iraqi state. He appealed to
his followers through tribal identification and religious affiliation. He also
used the concept of self-determination, as advanced by President Woodrow
Wilson, in his appeal to the British.
After
1930 the leadership of the Kurdish nationalist movement moved from the
Barzinjis of Sulaymaneyya to the Barzan family of Mosul. The two identifiable
leaders of this family were Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and his younger brother Mullah
Mustafa Barzani. The Barzanis were followers of the Naqshabandi Sufi order.
During the Second World War disturbances continued in Kurdistan and at war's
end an independent Republic of Mahabad was established by Mullah Mustafa under
Soviet tutelage. But the Republic collapsed in 1946 following the Soviet
withdrawal from Iran.
The
Barzinji and Barzani movement were based on the dual foundation of the tribal
and religious appeals. A different line of national development took place
among the westernized intellectuals who sought a secular foundation for the
movement. In 1946 the Kurdish Democratic Party was established. The secular
appeal was not based on any specific tribal following and as such represented
no major threat to the Iraqi state prior to 1958.
In
Turkish Kurdistan the organized opposition to the Turkish state has not been
substantial.Perhaps the most serious encounters between the nationalists and
the Turkish authorities took place in 1925. Shaykh Sait, a Naqshabandi Kurdish
leader from Eastern Anatolia, organized a short-lived revolt. The Kurdish
population had been divided between the tribalized and the detribalized Kurds.
The tribalized Kurds used Sufism to legitimize their movement while the
detribalized Kurds preferred a secular orientation. The tribalized groups,
however, were divided upon themselves between those who belonged to the small
tribes and those from the larger ones. It was among the small tribes that
Sufism prospered, and it was from the Zaza tribe that Shaykh Sait received most
of his support. One of the factors that led to the downfall of the movement was
the lack of contact with other Kurdish nationalist movements outside of Turkey,
nor was there contact with other opposition movements inside Turkey. When
Shaykh Sait and his followers were captured and hanged the movement disappeared
with them. The movement lasted between February and November 1925 in the area
west of Lake Van but had failed to control any major town or city in the
region. Sporadic disturbances continued thereafter but they lacked the
appearance of organization or stamina. The Turkish government did not hesitate
to use excessive force to put down all Kurdish resistance activities. The
government insisted on not recognizing the Kurds as a separate ethnic group.
The use of the Kurdish language was made illegal and any one suspected of
Kurdish nationalist leanings was imprisoned. During the 1960's and 1970's, in
an era of relaxation, bilingual Kurdish-Turkish journals and other publications
were allowed. But the Demirel government cracked down in 1967 and put a stop to
these publications. In the ensuing period the Kurdish leaders were rounded up
and imprisoned and the anti-Kurdish campaign was intensified. In the 1960's a
political party, The Turkish Workers Party, was founded and claimed to
represent the interests of the Kurdish population. Its support base was narrow
and its electoral votes were limited to 3 percent in the 1965 and 1969
elections. It was led by Mehmet Ali Aybar, a lawyer with Marxist orientation.
In October 1970 it was the first legally organized party to recognized the
right of the Kurds to form their own committees, but not necessarily to
self-determination. The 1970's and 1980's witnessed increased guerilla
activities in Turkish Kurdistan which corresponded to the struggle of the Kurds
in Iran and Iraq. Following the Iranian Revolution (1979) closer contacts were
established between the Kurds in turkey and their compatriots in Iran and Iraq.
In
Iran, the Kurdish nationalist under the leadership of Ismail Aqa, known as
Simqu, chief of the Sakkak tribe attempted to gain control over their territory
but were defeated at the hands of Reza in 1922. Simqu had established himself
as head of 10,000 Kurdish tribesmen in the area around Lake Urmiyah and defied
the central authorities as well as the other tribes in the region. When his
tribal forces were defeated he fled to Turkey and continued to stage raids on
the frontiers area until 1929. But he posed no major threat to Iran's security.
During
the Second World War the Iranian government's authority in Kurdistan weakened
steadily. In 1942, the Association for the Renaissance of Kurdistan was founded
in Mahabad under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad, a religious leader. In 1945,
this group merged with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). At this time Iraq
was supplying reinforcements and support for the Iranian nationalists. Qazi
Muhammad's efforts were enhanced by the flight of Mustafa Barzani from Iraq and
his defiance of the British and Iraqi efforts to subdue his movement. Qazi
Muhammad declared the autonomy of the Republic of Mahabad in January 1946.
Following
the collapse of Mahabad Republic and the execution of its leaders in 1947, the
Kurdish language was prohibited and the Kurdish press was destroyed. The KDP
went underground and adopted a leftist program. After the Iraqi Revolution of
1958 the party increased its activities of sabotage and the government
increased its harassment and repression. Many of the KDP leaders were jailed or
exiled. The others remained underground.
To
divert the attention away from the treatment of the Kurds in Iran, the Pahlavi
regime embarked on a policy of encouraging the rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds
against their government. After the removal of the Shah in 1979 disturbances
broke out throughout Iran. The Kurdish movement was revitalized. When the
Iran-Iraq was broke out, the movement gained momentum as the nationalist forces
from both countries established communication links and closed ranks by the end
of the war.
In
spite of the bloody history of the Iraqi-Kurdish relations, the Iraqi Kurds
have enjoyed more freedom of expression and more of a separate identity than
what the Kurds have had any where else in the region. In neither Iran nor
Turkey has the Kurdish existence as a separate identity been recognized. In
both countries the Kurds have been persecuted as Kurds. In Iraq, whether they
enjoyed greater or lesser amounts of freedom did not depend on their status as
Kurds but on what the general public enjoyed.
The
bloody revolution of 1958 in Iraq failed to resolve the festering problems of
the country, especially in dealing with the Kurdish population. Abdel Kareim
Qassim attempted to appease the Kurds by building a government of
"national unity" under a three-man sovereignty council which included
a Sunni, a Shi'i and a Kurd. But the council did not have any authority and its
impact was not felt. A revolt had taken place in Mosul in March 1959 by a local
commander but it was violently suppressed by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).
In July the ICP was blamed for bloody confrontations between the local Turkmen
elite and the Kurdish immigrants in Kirkuk. The ICP, which had a large
contingency of Kurds, was discredited in Kurdistan. Mustafa Barzani had
returned in 1958 from exile to lead the KDP. The Kurdish nationalists were
demanding improvement of the economic and social conditions in Kurdistan. They
associated with the Qassim regime as a reformist regime. But Qassim failed to
meet their demands and attempted repression. In 1961 the KDP was closed down.
Mustafa al-Barzani increased his resistance and proclaimed an independent
Kurdish state. Qassim attempted to gain control by playing one tribal group off
against another. Eventually, a military campaign was launched, in September
1961, against the Kurds. The Kurdish forces had reached 15,000 and were
supported by Iran which saw the republican regime in Iraq as a threat to
internal Iranian security. By 1963, a third of the Iraqi army was involved in
attempts to suppress the Kurdish uprising.
Following
the overthrow of Qassim, the Arif regime attempted to reach a settlement with
the Kurds. The ceasefire which was reached between Barzani and Abd al-Salam
Arif in 1964 resulted in splits within the KDP. Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal
al-Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and separated their
forces from the tribal groups. The Barzani faction remained the strongest and
he used the ceasefire to import weapons from Iran and to added to his forces'
strength. He proclaimed his own government in Kurdistan. In 1965-66 war was
renewed with the Baghdad government. In June 1966, a compromise agreement was
reached between the Barzani forces and the Bazzaz government which provided for
decentralized administration, but not autonomy, and recognized the use of the
Kurdish language in the region. Political representation was to be guaranteed
in a national assembly and economic reconstruction was to follow cessation of
hostilities. The agreement was not implemented and the war continued.
Another
agreement was reached in 1970, following the take over by the Ba'ath of powers
in Baghdad in 1968. The concessions made to the Kurds in 1970 were greater than
those made in the 1966 agreement. Kurdish autonomy was conceded in the region
and the Kurdish language was recognized as an official language. The Kurds were
to nominate a candidate for Vice President. The Kurdish armed forces, Peshmerga,
were to be integrated into the Iraqi regular army with special responsibility
in Kurdistan. The agreement broke down over the inclusion of Kirkuk in the
autonomous region and upon the urging of Iran, Israel and the United States. In
1974 the war resumed. When the Algiers Agreement of 1975 was reached between
Iran and Iraq, Iran halted its support for the Kurdish insurgency. A lull
occurred until the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 1980
following the Iranian Revolution.
In
1975, after the collapse of the resistance, Mustafa Barzani fled tot he United
States, where he died in 1979. His sons, Idris and Mas'ud, took charge of the
movement. The government implemented the 1970 agreement and created an
autonomous region which included Sulaymaneyya but not Kirkuk. The area was
divided into five provinces, including the new Province of Dohuk in the
northeastern corner of the country.
The
Iran-Iraq war offered the Kurds the opportunity to consolidate their control
over territories in the mountainous area. The nationalist movement gained
renewed strength with the support of the Iranians. But the war also emphasized
the irreconcilable differences between the Barzani and the Talabani groups. It
was only through Iranian meditations that the two groups agreed to overcome
their differences in 1986 and work for a common cause.
Today
the Kurds live in an area that is divided among Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and
the Soviet Union. The estimates of the size of the Kurdish population vary
widely. For example, The New York Times reporter Dana Adams Schmidt
estimates the total size of the Kurdish population in the world to be around 10
million. Contributors to People Without a Country estimate the number
to be around 15 million. Derk Kinnane, a Dutch writer and former lecturer in
Baghdad, estimates the number to be a little over 5 million. And Stephen C.
Pelletiere in The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf estimate the
number to be between 7 and 7.5 million. Other estimates of the Kurdish
population and its distribution in the various countries vary widely. Charles
MacDonald gives the following estimates of minority distribution in the Arab
countries and Iran as percentages of the total population.
Population
Distribution in
Iran and the Arab East
by Ethnic
Identification
|
Percentage/Country
|
Arabs
|
Persians
|
Kurds
|
So.Asian & Europe
|
|
Bahrain
|
73
|
9.0
|
|
18.0
|
|
Egypt
|
98.7
|
|
|
|
|
Iran
|
5.7
|
70.8
|
3.1
|
|
|
Iraq
|
73.5
|
1.7
|
21.6
|
|
|
Jordan
|
98.5
|
|
|
|
|
Kuwait
|
87.1
|
5.0
|
|
4.2
|
|
Lebanon
|
90.5
|
|
1.5
|
|
|
No. Yemen
|
92.2
|
|
|
|
|
Oman
|
90.6
|
|
|
|
|
Qatar
|
54.1
|
21.6
|
|
24.3
|
|
Saudi Arabia
|
91.4
|
|
|
|
|
So. Yemen
|
96.8
|
|
|
|
|
Syria
|
88.3
|
|
5.8
|
|
|
UAE
|
50.0
|
|
|
43.8
|
Source: MacDonald, Charles G. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian
Gulf. Westport, Conn.: London, England: Greenwood Press. 1980. Various
pages.
Several
agreements were negotiated between the Kurdish nationalists and successive
Iraqi governments but were not implemented, either because of the political
instability in Baghdad, or because of the Kurd's search for better deals
through alliances with external forces, such as Iran, Israel, the United
States, the Soviet Union, or any combination of these. After the Ba'ath took
over in 1968, negotiations between the government and the Kurdish leadership
were re-started. On 11 March 1970 a Manifesto was published which recognized
"the legitimacy of the Kurdish nationality" and promised Kurdish
linguistic rights, participation in the national government,
self-administration, and a new province centered in Dohuk. It also provided for
agricultural reforms. Although Arabic remained a compulsory topic in school,
the students in the Kurdish region were to learn and to be taught in Kurdish.
Although going a long way in meeting the demands of the Kurdish community, the
Manifesto was later denounced by Barzani as not going far enough, on the urging
of Israel, the United States, and Iran.
Both
Iran and Israel were uncomfortable with the presence of the Ba'ath in the Iraqi
government, each for their own reasons. They saw in the Kurdish nationalist
movement a means to destabilize that government. In 1973, the Iraqi government
called for creation of a National Front which would include all political
tendencies. The Communists and the Ba'athists joined the Front, but the KDP
refused to join. The KDP renewed their hostility, on Iran's urging, in 1974.
But the Algiers Agreement on Shatt Al-Arab in March 1975 brought an end to the
Iranian support for the Kurds and dashed their hopes. Those who were dissatisfied
with the new situation were permitted to seek refuge in Iran. Several thousand
took advantage of the offer. Relative peace prevailed in the Autonomous Region
until the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran.(2)
Go back to top
Since
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds' search for identity has been
influenced to no small degree by the relations between Iran and Iraq. The
Kurds' aspiration for an independent identity has been subjected to
manipulation by the rulers of these two countries to suite their own national
objectives. When interstate relations were poor, the Kurds' national goal
seemed to inch closer to realization. But when relations improved the Kurds'
objective fell by the way side.
The
relations between Iran and Iraq, leading to the Iran-Iraq War, centered around
two areas of ideological conflict: national and religious. On the national
front, and in an effort to impose their hegemony on the region, there existed a
conflict between proponents of Arab nationalism and Iranian nationalism. The
Iraqi Ba'athists proclaimed themselves the spokesmen of Arab nationalism and
Arab hegemony over the Gulf. The Shah earlier, and Khomeini later, expressed
Iranian nationalism, and attempted to impose Iranian hegemony over the Gulf by
building up the military force and making claims on Iraqi territory. Both forms
of nationalism were perceived as constituting mutual threats to the principals.
The religious ideological conflict is two dimensional: a Sunni-Shi'i conflict
and an intra-Shi'i conflict. The differences are theological and are of more
interest to the learned scholars than to the average person on the street. The
political leaders, however, capitalize on these differences and use them to
their own national interest's advantage.
The
ruling Ba'ath party in Iraq is an advocate of Pan- Arabism. It calls for a
comprehensive unity of all of the Arabs.(3) The ideology
advocated by the Ba'ath is secularist, socialist, and particularistic (to the
Arabs only) in orientation.(4) The Ba'ath ideology is also
particularistic in that it addresses itself to the "Arabhood" of the
people. Arabhood becomes the common experience that binds the people together.
It also seeks to unify those Arabs within the boundaries of one Arab
nation-state "from the Gulf to the Ocean." Only with this unity will
the Arabs restore their past glory. The Pan-Arab character of Ba'athism views
the present political boundaries as temporary and artificial and as foreign
inspired and imposed.
It
is this view that is perceived to be the most threatening. Pan-Arabism presents
a challenge to the Iranians' traditional claim of being the "policeman of
the Gulf" and to their hegemony in the area. To the Israelis, it represents
a threat in the expressed desire to "liberate Palestine" from
"Zionist control". To the traditional Arab leaders of the present
states, it represents loss of power and position. To the smaller and wealthier
states, it represents wealth- sharing. To the other ethnic groups, it
represents loss of identity to a yet larger political unit that exists
expressly to minimize their share in the political power distribution.
The
Ba'ath line of thinking, or at least that of Saddam Hussein, is that the Ba'ath
Arab Socialist Party is the only valid expression of Arab nationalism. Iraq
plays a pivotal role in this Arab nationalism as it is from there that the past
glory of the Abbasides will be revived. It was from Baghdad that the Abbasides
built their vast and flourishing empire, and it is from Baghdad that this will
come to pass again. The fact that the Ba'ath is in charge of Iraq's politics is
more than a mere co-incidence. And it is because of this unique role of the
Ba'ath Party in Iraq that it has enjoyed a virtual monopoly of power there.
During
the reign of the Shah, it was this Pan-Arab nationalism which did not appeal to
either the Shah or to the other Gulf rulers.(5) The Shah saw the
Iraqi Ba'ath regime as inviting Communism into the area. He could only see the
growing cooperation between Iraq and the Communist bloc. Fearful that the
Soviet Union would establish permanent presence in the Gulf, thus surrounding
Iran from both the north and the south, the Shah established closer ties with
the United States. Iran became America's first line of defense against Soviet
expansionism in the region. Political, military and economic advisors were
dispatched to Iran with a great deal of regularity. Both Congress and the White
House adopted policies of not denying Iran's requests for military upgrading.
The Shah, on his part, wanted to build Iran's military forces to rival those of
the major powers, and the United States helped get him there. Multi-billion
dollar contracts were signed annually, and deliveries of weapons and equipment
were prompt. By the time of his departure, the Shah had built Iran's military
power to be the sixth strongest in the world.(6)
Iranian
military build-up was an expression of Iranian nationalism. It could not have
deterred the Soviets if they had entertained aggressive or hostile intentions
towards Iran. Nor was it certain that the United States would have risked an
all-out war with the Soviets to curb Soviet expansion in the region. The
Iranian military build-up was designed to impress Iran's other neighbors,
particularly the Arabs as well as its own minority populations. And it did.
When the Iranian forces took over control of three islands at the mouth of the
Gulf (Abu Mousa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) in 1971 from the newly
created United Arab Emirates (UAE), no Arab state dared to challenge Iran's
actions with more that rhetoric. The Shah proclaimed Iran as the policeman of
the Gulf and cultivated goodwill among the Gulf rulers, excluding Iraq's.(7)
In
the twentieth century manifestations, the rivalry between the two neighbors has
been expressed in a number of arenas which are not limited to
post-revolutionary periods in either country. Iraq's fear of Iranian
expansionism has been so pervasive that frequent warnings go out of Baghdad
about the creation of a second Palestinian-type problem.(8) Accusations are also frequently made that Iran is trying to
"Persianize" the Gulf region through encouraging migration of
Iranians to other Gulf states.(9) There is the suspicion that
the Iranian immigrants constitute a fifth column and are the main source of
information about the Gulf states to the outside world, and especially to Iran.
The Iraqi regime has viewed itself as the defender of the Arabs against
possible Iranian incursions.(10) The close ties between Iran
and the United States during the Shah's regime and between Iraq and the Soviet
Union during the same period helped only to contribute to these fears and to
mutual suspicions and mistrust.
All
of this record adds to the Iraqi experience with the Pahlavi regime. But when
the revolutionary regime took over in Iran in 1979, the attitudes towards
nationalist issues did not seem to change. By October 1980, Iraq was charging
that Iran had been supplying the Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic Party rebels
with political and material support and encouraging insurgency into Iraq, in
violation of the 1975 agreements. Iraq charged that Iran was supplying weapons,
materials and propaganda instruments to the Kurdish rebels and opened borders
for the insurgents.(11)
And
while Saddam Hussein appointed himself spokesman and defender of Pan-Arabism,
and restorer of Arab rights, taking on the responsibility of
"liberating" the entire Arab side of the Gulf region from Iranian
control, Khomeini responded with the only language that he knew. He called
Saddam Hussein an "infidel" who only resembled the Shah. He called on
the Iranian people not to fear anything:
You
are fighting to protect Islam and he [Saddam Hussein] is fighting to destroy
Islam. At the moment, Islam is completely confronted by blasphemy, and you
should protect and support Islam .... There is absolutely no question of peace
or compromise and we shall never have any discussion with them [the Iraqis] ...
Our weapon is faith....(12)
It
was the sense of nationalism, among other things, which Khomeini said he was
revolting against. He considered nationalism as a divisive force and anathema
to Islamic thought and practice. He saw nationalism as a Western influence
designed to corrupt the leaders and the people. It is part of an imperialist
conspiracy which aims at destroying the Islamic Umma (nation) which is
made up of all Muslims throughout the world. Western-style nationalism creates
artificial boundaries that can only keep the Muslims apart rather than bring
them together. It can only lead to rivalry and conflict. Religion, Khomeini
argued, was the means to the salvation of not only the Arabs but of all the
Muslims. He saw the Islamic Revolution in Iran as the first brick in a much
larger structure, the Islamic homeland. Only when the corrupt and corrupting
rulers of Muslims throughout the world are replaced by Islamic revolutions will
the Umma be restored to its rightful place, the service of God and
doing his work on earth. (13)
The
initial response of the Iraqis to the Khomeini take over in Iran was one of
attempted reconciliation. However, it was not long before relations began to
sour and the Iraqis began to see the rule of the clergy in Iran as a return to
medieval politics, and to see Khomeini's call for Islamic ideals as another
manifestation of Iranian nationalism.(14) Iraqi clergy
took umbrage at Khomeini's claim of leading the world Shi'is. After all, it is
in Iraq that the two holiest shrines, outside of Mecca and Medina, exist.
After
the Iran-Iraq war broke out, the propaganda arms of both states began to harp
on the issue of nationalism, directly and indirectly, by emphasizing the
perceived superiority of their side and the perceived threat from the other
side. Hateful and insulting comments were regularly broadcast or printed that
aimed at creating a gulf between the national population and the enemy.
Go back to top
Iranian National Minorities:
Despite
the presence of numerous ethnic and linguistic minorities in both Iran and
Iraq, the most vocal and best organized have been the Kurds. Iran has more of
these national minorities than Iraq does, but both have used the Kurdish
population of their adversary as a tool of their own policy. But the support
that the uprisings of Kurdish minorities has received has not come only from
Iran and Iraq. Kurdish nationalists have received support from other countries,
particularly Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union, to serve these
countries' national objectives. This external support has weakened the
arguments of the Kurdish nationalists in face of their national governments as
well as their own people.
The
policy adopted by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in Iran, of suppressing nationalist
expressions for groups other than the Persians was continued under the Islamic
Republic. The attitude taken towards these minorities has been both disdainful
and patronizing. Illustrative of that attitude is a statement made by Makram
Shirazi, a member of the Majlis, in an interview in July 1979. After stating
that the Assembly rejected the idea of redefining boundaries along ethnic
lines, he stated:
I
think the most important question is one of feelings and sentiments (atefeh).
Economics is secondary. The Kurds have for years been seen and treated as
inferior people. The propaganda machinery of the past aimed at playing down
their rights and sympathies. They were portrayed as barbaric, backwards,
feeble, etc. What we have to do is prove to them that we accept them as equals;
that they are as capable as others. They can participate in the management and
administration of their affairs just as we can. When this problem is solved we
will be able to solve the economic and welfare problems of the region.(15)
The
Islamic Republic does not recognize the national minorities as having
legitimate claims to their own self identification. The only recognized
minorities under the present constitution are the religious minorities.
The
Iranians could still remember the creation of the "independent"
republics in Azerbaijan and Mahabad, under the tutelage of the Soviet
occupation forces. The attitude towards national minorities after the war was
one of lack of tolerance for nationalist expressions and discrimination between
those they wished to co-opt and those they wished to exclude from the political
equation.
The
Kurds were promised a better life elsewhere, primarily in Iraq. Iraqi
nationalist Kurds were encouraged under the Shah and the Islamic Republic to
undermine the Iraqi government authority. However, the Iranian nationalist
Kurds were treated harshly and their freedom of expression was severely
restricted.(16)
Those
minorities which were co-opted included the Azeris. The Azerbaijan nationalists
demanded autonomy, but not breakaway of Azerbaijan. Azeris such as Ahmed
Kasrovi and Hassan Taqizadeh received recognition under the Shah. Since 1979
there have been many pro-Khomeini and Islamic Republic Azeris who have held
prominent positions in the IRP and the government. Another group favored under
the Shah was the Turkmans. But being primarily Sunnis, they felt that their
position was in jeopardy under the Islamic Republic, particularly that Article
12 of the Constitution stipulates that the Ja'afari sect of Shi'ism is the
official state religion. Peasant uprisings during the 1980s were put down
fiercely by the Revolutionary Guards.
The
Turkmans and the Kurds are minorities that exist in both Iraq and Iran. The
Turkmans who live primarily in and around the Mosul area, between the Arabs and
the Kurds, have found it more difficult to have their own recognizable identity
in view of all the Arab-Kurdish confrontations of the twentieth century.
The
Baluchis and the Arabs were among the groups least favored economically and
politically under both regimes. Economically, Baluchistan is the poorest and
least developed region. The Baluchis are primarily Sunnis and must share their
region with a minority of Shi'i Sistans. The Sistan are favored politically
under the Islamic Republic to hold municipal elective or appointive positions.
(The elective offices are controlled through the nomination process.) In
Zahedan, for instance, whose population is at least 50% Sunnis, all 12
candidate nominees for the 6 seat local council were Shi'is in 1979. Local
protests were ignored and the councilmen were "elected".(17)
The
Arabs of Khozestan have all but been excluded from decision-making positions,
whether in the public or private sector. Despite the presence of the Arabs in
large concentration in the main cities of the oil-rich region (80% in
Khorramshahr, 60% in Ahvaz, and 50% in Abadan), they account for only 20
percent of the labor force in the oil industry, and they work mostly in
low-level jobs with little control over operations. "Still the government
is taking no chances. Systematically, the revolutionary committees have been
purged of suspicious Arab elements and replaced with loyal militiamen from
elsewhere."(18)
Go back to top
The
Iraqi Kurdish Minority and the Iran-Iraq War:
The
Algiers Agreement of 1975 between Iraq and Iran which(19) put an end to the differences between the two countries also dashed the
hopes of the Kurdish nationalists. The Iranian support to them stopped. They
could no longer hope for more concessions. However, the outbreak of war in
September 1980 gave renewed hope to the Kurdish nationalists to press for their
objective of greater independence.
The
Autonomy Manifesto declared on 11 March 1970 provided for granting the Kurdish
Autonomous Region self-rule under the umbrella of the central government as of
1974. However, the implementation of the plan was delayed until 1980. The
Kurdish Autonomy Law provided for an Executive Council to administer the
region. It would consist of a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, and 10-12 members.
The President of the Republic appoints the Chairman from among the elected
members of the Legislative Council. The Chairman, in turn, appoints his own
team from the Legislative Council. But the President has the authority to
dismiss the Chairman, and with him the entire Executive Council. The first
Legislative Council consisted of 50 members and was elected in 1980. Successive
Councils were elected in 1984 and 1988. The Agreement also provided for
proportional representation in the national legislature, representation on the
national cabinet, and maintaining the Peshmerga as a border guard
unit. The Iraqi government attempted in 1984 and 1985 to negotiate another
agreement with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) but the talks proved
difficult and were aborted. Ironically, the elections for the regional
legislative council had been scheduled to be held three days after the Iraqi
troops moved into Iran in September 1980. The elections were held on schedule
and 50 representatives were elected out of a field of 264 government approved
candidates. The stalled election had been delayed, inter alia, over the issue
of the choice of vice-president. The government would not accept the nominee of
the nationalists and they, in turn, would not submit other names as candidates
for the post. The government's objection was that the nominated candidate was
of Iranian mixed blood, thus not a "pure" Kurd. But by September
1980, the government had decided to appoint a Kurdish vice-president without
the input of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
The
Iraqi Kurdish nationalists' declared aims were to gain autonomy for their
region (they never officially demanded independence nor showed any sustained
interest in a separate Kurdish state to be carved out of Turkey, Iran and Iraq)(20) and they used the war to press for autonomy on their own terms. It is
possible that the nationalists' undeclared aims were different from those
publicly announced and that they really wanted separation as a minimum, or
incorporation into a Greater Kurdistan as a maximum.(21) The rich oil deposits of Iraqi Kurdistan would provide a basis for a
viable political entity. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq
and Iran, the Peshmerga opened a new offensive against Iraqi army
units in their region.
In
the meantime, Iraqi Kurds who fled to Iran following the March 1975 Algiers
Agreement had been in a state of rebellion since 1979.(22) One of the aims of their leader, Sheikh Hosseini, was to break up the
existing provincial borders and to create a larger Kurdistan in Iran. According
to existing provincial boundaries, only one-third of Iran's Kurds lived within
the Province of Kurdistan while the rest were scattered in Western Azerbaijan,
Kermanshah and other provinces.(23) The resurgence of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party, the conflicts between peasants and landlords,
between Shi'is and Sunnis, the continuing poverty and the call for
"autonomy now or never" turned the situation in the region into an
explosive one.(24) But the rebellion in Iran was short-lived due to
increasingly repressive anti- minority policies in Tehran. It was once again in
Iraq where the Kurdish hostilities were the most troublesome.(25)
Instead
of reaching a negotiated agreement with the government, the Kurdish guerrillas,
in coordination with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), mounted raids
and sabotage activities against the Iraqi army in the north. After years of
rivalry, the PUK and the KDP, under Iranian tutelage, decided in 1986 to set
aside their differences. It was only after the new alliance was formed and the
actions of the combined forces became more destructive that the Iraqi
government decided in 1987 to adopt a policy of "scorched earth." The
new policy called for razing a number of Kurdish villages in the border zone
which was declared a "security zone" and their inhabitants were
resettled in newly constructed villages away from the combat zone. In
interviews held in that region, the present author was told that the vast
majority of the inhabitants of the villages were intimidated and coerced into
cooperating with the militias, under threats to their lives and property, and
that they welcomed the resettlement as a relief from the pressures of the Peshmerga.
Such
attitudes cast doubts about ideas of a monolithic Kurdish nationalism. The most
troublesome activities attributed to the guerilla forces by the residents were
the indiscriminate acts of destruction of lives and property, desecration of
religious centers, kidnapping of the mullahs, and the absence of any scruples
in dealing with the civilian population. In the interim years between the
signing of the Algiers Agreement and the reconciliation agreement, the KDP under
the leadership of the Barzani brothers, Idris and Masoud, and the PUK, under
the leadership of Jalal Talabani, were competing for control over wider swaths
of territory, using the civilian population as chess pieces.
By
1986, the guerrillas were launching daily attacks on the Iraqi forces hitting
military bases, oil installations, communication and radar bases and other
targets. They were armed with heavy weapons supplied by Iran and posed
increasing dangers to the security of Iraq.(26) They became more
bold as the war progressed. As the Iranians suffered military setbacks in the
south, they encouraged more intensive Kurdish attacks in the north to relieve
the pressure on the southern front.
At
stake for Iraq, more than the loss of control over part of the country, was the
security of the new pipelines through Turkish territories which became Iraq's
new blood line. Should the Kurds have gained control over the pipelines, they
would have choked off Iraqi oil exports totally and paralyzed the economy. The
Government would settle for nothing less than total military victory to rid the
country of the "menace" once and for all. This gave rise to Iranian
claims of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish rebels and civilians.
After hostilities cease and peace is restored, the Iraqi government figured,
reconciliation with the civilian population could be tried. Indeed, the
post-war reconstruction level in Kurdistan exceeded in scope and intensity any
other part of the country.
The
increased guerilla activities of the Kurdish rebels, which resulted in taking
control of the mountain villages by night while the Army was in control by day,
and the level of destruction inflicted on the region were bound to spill over
into Turkey. But Turkey was not willing to tolerate rebellious actions within
its borders. A tacit agreement was reached between the Iraqi and Turkish
governments which allowed the Turkish forces to pursue the guerrillas inside
Iraqi borders, and even to stage bombing raids on the Iraqi Kurdish villages.(27) Iran and Turkey reached an agreement that forbade border crossings of
guerilla forces and "any activity aimed against the other's
security."(28) The Turks had denied the Kurds any form of national
expression for over 50 years and preferred to see matters continue that way.
Following
Iran's acceptance of the UN ceasefire resolution (No. 598), the Iraqi Army,
with renewed self-confidence and more enforcements, the front lines being much
shorter, pushed deep into Kurdish strongholds in the northeast mountains, in
September 1988, in a determined effort to crush the separatist movement. The
relocated Kurds had to evacuate a corridor about 30 miles wide along the
Iranian and Turkish borders. Between 50,000(29) and 60,000(30) fled to Turkey and a similar number fled to Iran. The remaining
displaced individuals were relocated within Iraq. Some were reported to be
relocated on the Jordanian, Saudi and Kuwaiti borders.(31) But Iraqi officials (Kurds and Arabs) interviewed denied the
authenticity of these claims. Iraq claimed that these relocations were for
security reasons and that the resettled Kurdish population enjoyed amenities
previously unavailable to them such as electricity, piped water and paved
roads; all of which improve their standard of living.(32) It was not possible to obtain figures from government sources in Iraq
about the number of those resettled.
The
Iraqi Army succeeded in its "pacification" efforts and restored law
and order to the Autonomous Region. Perhaps the success of the government forces,
in addition to the use of more fire power, can be attributed to divisions
within the ranks of the Kurdish nationalists. Additionally, the rural-urban
cleavages are very pronounced among the Kurdish communities. The Kurdish
population is 51.3% rural, and only Kirkuk has a population of more than
100,000. Two cities, Arbil and Sulaymaneyya, have populations of over 50,000.(33) The absence of large concentrations of populations makes the pockets of
resistance relatively weak, even if they might be widely spread. Another factor
might have been the fact that none of the countries with a Kurdish minority
would welcome the creation of a new political entity carved out of any of them,
lest the contagion would spread into others.
The
Iranians played the Kurdish card to distract the Iraqi forces when they were
ready to launch major offensives, particularly between 1984 and 1986 during the
invasion of the Fao Peninsula. Also, when the Iraqis launched their
counter-attack to re-take Fao, Majnun Island and the Howeiza marshes, the
Kurdish card was played again. The Kurds were supplied with arms, ammunition
and heavy equipment, including anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tank launchers
by Iran. They were also given sanctuary inside Iran. With Iranian help, the
Kurdish insurgents took control of a number of key positions in the mountains.
Ironically,
the Iranian advances into northern Iraq in January 1984 started out as
anti-Kurdish sweeps. But the Iranians captured some 220 square kilometers of
Iraqi territory. Val Fajr 4 added another 1813 square kilometers of
Iranian territorial gains. These gains served as a bridgehead from which
anti-Iraqi Kurds could operate. The Iranians conserved their own fighting
forces and relied on the Kurdish insurgents.(34)
After
the Iranians announced their willingness to accept a ceasefire, the Iraqi army
launched a no holds barred offensive against the Kurdish insurgents. Fighting
continued between Iraqi troops and Kurdish autonomist guerrillas. But with the
Iranian front calm, the Iraqi military concentrated its efforts on the Kurdish
front line. American and Kurdish dissident sources charged Iraq with using
chemical weapons against the Kurdish population, especially in Halabjeh.(35) But the Iraqis claimed that it was Iran which initiated the use of
chemical weapons and that it was the Iranians who bombed Halabjeh.(36) Nevertheless, a large number of Kurdish villages were destroyed during
the war. Estimates of the number of destroyed villages varied widely, ranging
between 300,(37) and 3000.(38) The number of
homeless Kurds who had to be resettled also differed widely. One estimate
alleged that "several hundred thousand" Kurds were relocated,(40) while another estimate was of 800,000.
Traveling
through Iraqi Kurdistan in mid-1990, it was difficult to determine how many
such villages had been razed nor how many Kurds had been resettled. But what
was evident was the very small number of villages on the main roads, and the
construction effort to build "tourist facilities." The facilities
were designed to attract wealthy Arabs from the Gulf states, especially
Kuwaitis, to spend their summer vacations. Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
it is inconceivable that many wealthy Arabs from the Gulf states would want to
spend their summer vacations in Iraq in the near future.
The
government's autonomy plan stood a better chance of enforcement once the
Barzani forces were defeated and driven out of the country. Elections for the
regional assembly, first held in 1980, were repeated in 1984 and 1988. Only pro-government
candidates were allowed to run for office. The winners scored decisive
victories in all these elections. The central government appeared, at least for
the time being, to have won the battle against the Kurdish nationalists. The
fight for autonomy shifted to Turkey and Iran.
To
avert the possibility of renewal of the uprising, the government in Baghdad
dedicated disproportionate amounts of economic development funds to Iraqi
Kurdistan. The objective was to revive the region economically and to strike a
balance between the region's wealth in natural resources and poverty in
economic development. One of the complaints of the autonomists was that despite
the vast amounts of oil found in Kurdistan, and exploited for the benefit of
all of Iraq, the Kurdish region had the slowest rate of economic development
and lowest per capita income.
The
Baghdad government's effort to appease the Kurdish nationalists failed. Upon
the defeat of the national army and the Presidential Guard at the hands of the
U. S.-lead coalition, insurrection was declared both in Basra and in Kurdistan.
The Basra insurrection was easier to suppress. By mid-March 1991, the Kurdish
autonomists under the leadership of Talabani were in control of much of Iraqi
Kurdistan. The Barzani forces took control of an even bigger portion of
northern Iraq. Under the direction of both groups large numbers of Kurdish
civilians fled to Iran and Turkey. Taking advantage of the collapse of
authority in Baghdad and the presence of American forces in the region as part
of the UN Coalition Forces, the Kurdish nationalist leaders sought the
internationalization of their claims. By dramatizing their demands through
encouraging hundreds of thousands to flee to neighboring countries, the
nationalist leaders hoped that pressure would be imposed on Iraq to finally
make the necessary concessions.
But,
once again, the Kurdish nationalist leaders under-estimated the resilience of
the Iraqi government and the response of the neighboring states, particularly
Turkey. The American policy makers, who were gratified to receive the support
of the Kurdish resistance movement during the fighting to remove the Iraqi
forces from Kuwait, were not willing to go the extra step and gratify the
demands of the Kurds. Long-term security arrangements, including many
unresolved issues with Turkey mandated that the Kurdish nationalist objectives
take the back seat. The Kurdish refugees in Turkey, who were outnumbered by
those in Iran by a ratio of two-to-one according to some press reports, received
the lion's share of attention. A "safe zone" was established in
northern Iraq, ostensibly to provide a margin of safety to the Kurdish
population, proved to be safe only from Iraqi attacks but not from Turkish air
raids. The Turkish military forces pursued guerrilla forces of the Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Ocalan, into Iraq and occupied a
"security belt" along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The PKK forces have
been training in Lebanon under the sponsorship of Syria. Their aim has been to
create an independent Kurdistan. They have rejected the negotiation efforts by
both Talabani and Barzani, accusing them of favoring their own tribal ambitions
and overlooking the general interests of all the Kurds. It is worthy of notice
that the PKK is Marxist-Leninist and that it seeks to establish a secular
state. It has targeted its activities on Turkey and as such has not been too
involved in the interactions between the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad or in Iranian
confrontations with the Kurds there. In their support of the PKK, Syria hopes
to use them as a negotiating card in dealing with Turkey over border and water
issues. (The PKK has been denounced by the Talabani and Barzani forces for its
lack of realism and for undermining the negotiations for autonomy in Iraq.)
Activation of the Kurdish nationalists in a military struggle, with renewed
vigor, could only threaten the internal security of Turkey and loosen the grip
on the Kurdish population in Eastern Anatolia.
The
Kurdish guerilla leaders, Barzani and Talabani, were left to their resources to
negotiate a workable arrangement with the Iraqi regime. The stumbling blocks in
the most recent negotiations were the same that were present in 1970: the
status of Kirkuk and of the Peshmerga.
The
failure of the Kurdish nationalist movement to attain its objectives has been
due, to no small extent, to the willingness of its leaders to allow themselves
to be used to fulfill the policy objectives of others who have used the Kurds
as a pawn in the balance of forces game. In the scheme of regional and global
politics, the Kurds have proven to be an expendable commodity in the hands of
the decision makers.
Go back to top
Footnotes
* This article is in copyright. No
reproduction of any part May take place without the written permission of the
author.
1. See: Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: A Historical and
Political Study. (London Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 6-32.
2. For more details, see: Cardri, Saddam's Iraq:
Revolution or Reaction? (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989), pp. 180-98; J. M.
Abdul Ghani, Iran & Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London &
Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984); Arab Reports and Memo (Beirut: An- Nahar)
Vol. 4, 1980, No. 15; R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz and Lewis W. Snider, Middle
East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp.
77-104; and Sa'ad Jawad, "Recent Developments in the Kurdish Issue"
in Tim Niblock, ed., Iraq: The Contemporary State (London &
Canberra: Croom Helm; and Exeter: Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1982), pp.
47-61.
3. For a comprehensive look at the Ba'ath philosophy
and history, see, for example: J.M. Abdul Ghani, Iran & Iraq: The Years
of Crisis (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984); Tim Niblock, ed.,
Iraq, the Contemporary State (London & Canberra: Croom Helm; and
Exeter: Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1982); Khaddouri, The Gulf War;
A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Balance Sheet," in R.C. Sharma, Perspectives
on Iran-Iraq Conflict (New Delhi: Bajesh Publications, 1984); Nick Childs,
The Gulf War (East Essex, England: Wayland, 1989); Mark A. Heller, The
Iran-Iraq War: Implications for Third Parties, Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies, 1984); Majid Khaddouri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics
Since 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978); Saddam
Hussein, Iraqi Politics in Perspective, translated by A.W. Lu'lu'a
(Baghdad: Translation and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981); Saddam
Hussein, Nazrah fil Dein wal Turath (Baghdad: Dar al Hurriyah, 1978);
John Devlin, The Ba'ath Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966
(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1976).
4. The philosophy of the Ba'ath Party recognizes the
special contributions of Islam to the Arabs, but does not agree with the
preposition that without Islam there would not have been an Arab culture. Arab
civilizations had existed prior to Islam, and Islam came to give the Arabs the
special characteristics that they now have. The Arabs, however, are not all
Muslims but are a mix of different religious orientations. They gain their
identity from their cultural heritage, which is influenced by Islam as well as
other influences. For the Arab nationalists to express their identity, they
need not set aside their religious affiliation or abandon their religious practices.
They need to place religion in its proper perspective, side-by-side with other
considerations. Religious and temporal affairs can and should exist independent
of each other. The political philosophy is thus secularist but not atheistic.
It advocates freedom of conscience. State laws, while they must adhere to
certain moral precepts, should not be subject to supervision or final approval
by a religious body, nor should religious rules be dictated by the state.
The Ba'athist ideology is socialist in the sense of being
egalitarian. It is not a socialism that is based on a Western philosophy or
experience, but on Arab philosophy and experience. To the extent that the Arab
people did not undergo the ravishes of industrialization that Western societies
experienced, and to the extent that a classical class structure did not evolve
in the Arab world, Western socialist ideas are irrelevant to the Arab east.
However, the concepts of egalitarianism and social justice are not alien to the
Arabs. Arab socialism is based on equal opportunity for individuals within a
caring patrimonial society. Under the guise of socialism, Iraq nationalized the
major industrial, commercial and service sectors of the economy. Individuals
were allowed to own small plots of land, small businesses, or industrial
projects. Employment became a guaranteed right to all who seek it, as did
health care, education and social services. In an attempt to maintain a level
of support within the system, the Iraq government liberalized some of the laws
and practices regarding private property following the end of the Iraq-Iran
war. But the effects of that liberalization were not far reaching.
5. See Heller, The Iran-Iraq War; Khaddouri, The
Gulf War; Abdul Ghani, p. 46; The Iranian, An Independent Weekly,
Vol. 1, No. 5, July 25, 1979, p. 7.
6. Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and
the Islamic Revolution (London and other cities: Hutchinson, 1985), p. 19.
7. James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The
Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1988); also, Abdul Ghani, ibid., p. 55; Shahram
Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State
in a Zone of Great Power Conflict (Berkeley: The University of California
Press, 1974), p. 189.
8. Abdul Ghani, op. cit., p. 78.
9. See an example of such changes in Al Thawrah,
December 27, 1972.
10. Ibid.; also, this attitude was pervasive
in interviews held by this author with numerous Iraqi officials and is most evident
in government publications.
11. Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Al-Niza'a al-'
Iraqi-al-Iran fil Qanoon al-Duwali (Baghdad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1981), p. 15.
12. Quoted in Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran,
p. 64.
13. For Khomeini's views on nationalism, see, for example:
Belta, Iran-Irak; Khaddouri, The Gulf War; Daniel Piper,
"A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict" in Tahir-Kheli, op.
cit., pp. 3-26; Nazih N. Ayubi, "Arab Relations in the Gulf; the
Future and Its Prologue" in Tahir-Kheli, op. cit., pp. 146-171;
Abdul Ghani, ibid., pp. 170-179; Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic
Government [n.p.] [n.d.], p. 14; David Simpson, Behind Iranian Lines,
pp. 198-199; Ayatollah Khomeiny, Principes Politiques, Philosophiques,
Sociaux et Religioux: Extraits de trois ouvrages majeurs de l'Ayatollah
(Paris: Editions Libres-Hallier, 1979); Amir Tahir, The Spirit of Allah:
Khomeini and the Islamic Government (London and other cities: Hutchinson,
1985).
14. Piper, op. cit., p. 7; Abdul Ghani, op.
cit., pp. 182-184; Al Thawrah, September 18, 1980 and May 15,
1982; The Iranian: An Independent Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 25, July 25,
1979, p. 7; Saddam Hussein, The Khomeini Religion (Baghdad: Dar al
Mamun, 1988); Latif Naseif Jasim, Al-Zahira al-Khomeiniyya (The
Khomeini Phenomenon) (London: Iraqi Press Office, 1981).
15. The Iranian, An Independent Weekly.
(Tehran), Vol. 1, No. 16, 17 October 1979, pp. 8-10.
16. For a fairly good but brief discussion of ethnic
minorities in Iran, see: Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Minorities Question in
Iran," in Sherin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., The Iran-Iraq
War: New Weapons and Old Conflicts (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 85-108.
17. Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 17, 24 October 1979, p. 7.
18. Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 16, 17 October 1979, p. 12.
19. In March 1975 the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
and the Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, reached an agreement on
demarcation of the borders between the two countries along the Shatt al-Arab
River. The agreement settled a long standing dispute in which Iran had been
demanding Iraqi recognition of the thalweg principle on that portion of the
border. In return for Iraqi acquiescence to the Iranian demands, Iran pledged
to cease support for insurgency operations by Kurdish guerrillas and put a stop
to any border infiltration by the Kurds into Iraq. Iraq was given a free hand
to deal with the Kurds as it saw fit. After inflicting a military defeat on the
Peshmerga the Iraqi government proceeded to implement the 1970
Autonomy agreement.
20. McLaurin, op. cit., p. 77.
21. Cardri, op. cit., pp. 186-87.
22. Arab Reports and Memo, Vol. 4, No. 15, 7 April
1980, pp. 6-7.
23. The Iranian, Vol. 1, No. 2, 4 July 1979, p. 15.
24. Ibid.
25. Nick Childs, The Gulf War (East Sussex,
England: Wayland, 1989), p. 46; and Cardri, op. cit., p. 198.
26. Childs, ibid.; Jane's Defense Weekly (Jane's),
Vol. 7, No. 11, 21 March 1987, p. 482; and No. 19, 16 May 1987, p. 920.
27. Jane's, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2 September 1984, p.
442.
28. Jane's, Vol. 2, No. 23, 15 December 1984, p.
1054.
29. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Iraq: Country
Report, No. 4-1988, p. 5.
30. Jane's, loc. cit.
31. EIU, Iraq: Country Report, No. 1-1988, pp. 8-9.
32. The Truth About Kurds in Iraq, (London: The
Iraqi Press Office in London, July 1989), p. 5.
33. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central
Statistics Organization, Annual Abstracts of Statistics, 1988 (Baghdad:
Printing Department, C. S. O., 1988), p. 45.
34. Jane's, Vol. 1, No. 3, 28 January 1984, p. 108.
35. Jane's, No. 10, No. 12, 24 September 1988, p.
715.
36. Mohamed Sadiq al-Mashat, Iraqi Ambassador to the United
States, Interview on CNN, 19 August 1990.
37. EIU, Iraq: Country Report, No. 4-1988, p. 5.
38. Jane's, loc. cit.
39. EIU, Iraq: Country Report, No. 3-1989,
pp. 9-10.
40. Jane's, loc. cit.
From the New York Times – September 1, 2005
September 2, 2005
Ex-Rebel Kurd Savoring
Victory in Iraq's Politics
By DEXTER FILKINS
BAGHDAD,
Iraq, Sept. 1 - The old
Kurdish guerrilla leader is savoring his most recent victory, won not on the
field of battle but in the arid drawing rooms of Baghdad's constitutional
convention.
In three weeks of talks here,
Massoud Barzani, the former guerrilla leader, quietly secured in the new Iraqi
constitution virtually everything the Kurds were asking for, enshrining powers
of autonomy that approach those of a sovereign state.
"Let me tell you, politics is
much more difficult than war," said Mr. Barzani, 59, the leader of the
Kurdish Democratic Party, who was a warlord when he was younger. "In
politics, there are so many more fronts."
The new Iraqi constitution, which
will go before voters on Oct. 15, grants the Kurds vast lawmaking powers,
control over their 60,000-man militia, and authority over new discoveries of
oil and gas. The Kurds even secured a deadline of Dec. 31, 2007, for bringing
back tens of thousands of Kurds expelled by the armies of Saddam Hussein in the
1980's.
The constitution limits the
exclusive powers of the central government in Baghdad to a few important areas
like control over currency, foreign policy and defense. Policy making in areas
like health care and the environment would be "shared" between the
Kurds and Baghdad, but the Kurds would have the right to change most federal laws
if they conflicted with local legislation. That includes federal taxes.
The new constitution would ratify
all laws passed by the Kurdish regional government since 1992.
In effect, the new Iraqi
constitution formally ratifies the quasi-independent status the Kurdish region
has held since 1991, when the murderous postwar rampages of Mr. Hussein
prompted the United States to set
up a security umbrella that allowed the Kurds to flourish outside the control
of the central government in Baghdad.
In the new constitution, the Kurds
did not achieve significantly new powers, but they did not give any up, either.
The one significant concession made
by the Kurds in the constitutional talks was the deletion of language allowing
them the right to secede, under certain circumstances, from the Iraqi state.
Kurdish leaders say they regarded the secession clause as mostly symbolic. They
leave little doubt that they regard the new constitution as but a way station
on a journey to eventual independence.
"In the last decade, major
changes took place in the world that gave many people their freedom," Mr.
Barzani said. "I would not be surprised to see such changes in our
region."
But he chose his words carefully,
so as not to offend his friends, like the Americans, or his adversaries, like
the Turks and the Iranians, who have significant Kurdish minorities in their
countries that they fear might make similar demands.
"The constitution should not
just be ink on paper," Mr. Barzani said. "Until such time, we will
adhere to it."
It was no small irony that the
negotiations over the constitution, which is intended to hold this fractious
country together, took place inside the Baghdad compound of Mr. Barzani, who
has spent much of his adult life trying to keep the rest of Iraq at bay.
Indeed, some of the most crucial talks over the constitution unfolded beneath a
portrait of Mustafa Barzani, Massoud's father, a guerrilla leader who founded
the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1946.
For most Iraqi leaders, Kurdish
autonomy was so firmly entrenched, and its existence so morally compelling,
that it could not be seriously disputed. In the 1980's, Mr. Hussein and his
forces are believed to have killed hundreds of Kurds, many with poison gas.
But some Iraqis do worry that the
precedent set by Kurdish autonomy could ultimately spell the end of Iraq - first
by Kurdish secession, and later by similar designs by others, like Iraq's
majority Shiites, who secured the right to set up an autonomous region of their
own. The critics also worry that the new constitution, by declaring that
control over resources like water must be shared, may also have sown the seeds
for future conflicts.
"The Kurds act as if they are
representatives of a state and we in Iraq are another state," said Wael
Abdul Latif, a Shiite member of the Iraqi constitutional committee. "Under
this constitution, Kurdish independence is just a matter of time."
At a news conference this week,
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador here, suggested that granting the
Kurds extensive powers of self-rule - that is, setting up a federal system -
was the only realistic option. The Kurds, he said, would not have tolerated
anything less.
"The Kurds say they will not
come back unless Iraq is federal," Mr. Khalilzad said, using the word for
strong regional autonomy.
That may be true for now, but it is
evident that the Kurds have longer-term goals. In a nonbinding referendum held
in Iraq's three Kurdish provinces in January, some 98 percent of those who
voted cast ballots in favor of independence. If the central government in
Baghdad tried to curtail Kurdish powers, the demands would grow more insistent.
"If the constitution is not
implemented and things don't move swiftly, then people will want their
independence," said Dr. Mahmood Othman, a Kurdish leader who was a
physician to Mustafa Barzani.
Yet for all their clamoring for
independence, Dr. Othman said, the Kurds played an important, secular role in
counterbalancing the demands of the cleric-dominated Shiite majority, which
pushed for a constitution with a more heavily Islamic character. The
constitution's protections for individual rights are largely Kurdish
achievements, Dr. Othman said.
"The Kurds were fighting for
all Iraqis," he said.
He said the Kurds would probably
not have achieved as much had Iraq's Sunni leaders agreed to the constitution.
Now, he said, it is imperative for the Kurds to try to bring the Sunnis back on
board, lest the constitution that grants the Kurds so much go down to defeat.
With the talks on the constitution
over, the atmosphere in Mr. Barzani's compound was that of a visiting sports
team that has come a long way to play a match. With the game won, many of the
players were itching to go home, away from the sweltering plains of Baghdad and
back to the cooler mountains they call home.
Few were more eager than Mr.
Barzani.
"If they would let me,"
Mr. Barzani said, laughing, "I would leave right now."
Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedy
and Robert F. Worth contributed reporting for this article.
Return
to Ethnicity
Return
to Outline