120-03
Course
Notes are at bottom of page
SYLLABUS
PHILOSOPHY 120-03
Introductory Philosophy (Course ID # 001091) T H 10:00-11:20
Winona State U.
Spring 2016
Lourdes 157
Instructor: Ed Slowik/325 Minne/Office phone: 457-5663
Office Hours: T H 2:30-3:30 PM, and by appointment.
The best time to talk to me is before or after class, but please feel free to
set up an appointment.
Texts:
Required: Introducing Philosophy,
R. Solomon, 10th ed. (Oxford)
Optional: How To Think About Weird
Things, T. Schick, Jr. & L. Vaughn, 5th ed. (Mayfield)
Course Objectives:
This course will examine basic concepts and problems in philosophy. In
particular, we will examine issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and the
philosophy of religion, mainly through contemporary and classic readings. We
will be concerned with such important questions as: Do we have free-will, or
are we determined to behave in certain ways? What is our personal identity
consist in? What is the nature of morality? Does God exist?, etc. We will also
examine the alleged difference between science and pseudo-science (e.g., ESP,
astrology, etc.) as a means of introducing concepts critical thinking.
Course Structure and Requirements:
The breakdown of the grade is as follows: 4 Tests, which includes the
Final Exam, and with the lowest score dropped: 33% for each of the three
counted tests, but with class participation and attendance factored into that
grade as well.
Midterm dates: Tues., Feb. 9; Tues., March 1; Tues., March 29; Final
Exam is on Wed., May 4 (but with an optional test day on the last day of class,
Tues., April 26).
Both the midterms and the final will consist of multiple choice and
true/false questions. The final exam will not be comprehensive but only cover
material since the last midterm. The tests will largely be based on the notes
on the website. But, I will occasionally include material in class that is not
in the notes, or give hints on what to expect on the upcoming test: so it is
important to show up each day! If students prefer to take an essay exam (in
place of the true/false, multiple choice), I will be happy to provide this
option for all the exams in the class.
For extra credit, the lowest score of the four exams will de dropped,
and there will be a further extra credit option through reviewing philosophy
films shown in class
Phil 120 satisfies both the General Education and University Studies
requirements in the Humanities category. Students can review the University Studies criteria satisfied by this
course either by checking the WSU main web page or by stopping in the
Philosophy Department (Minne 353).
Web Page:
As mentioned above, information on the course will be posted on a web
page. The information will include class notes and the syllabus. The link is: http://course1.winona.edu/eslowik
Schedule:
We will often change the schedule on a day-to-day basis. So, it is
important to show up for class to get the exact readings for each upcoming
class and week. Below is rough outline of the general readings for each week
from the text.
Week
1: Introduction, film (Jan. 12, 14)
Week
2: Logic (introduction chapter), start chap. 1 (Jan. 19, 21)
Week
3: chap. 1 (Jan. 26, 28)
Week
4: finish chap. 1 (Feb. 2, 4) No Class,
Thurs., Feb. 4.
Week
5: midterm, start chap. 4 & 6 (Feb. 9, 11) Midterm 1 (Tues., Feb. 9)
Week
6: chap. 4 & 6 (Feb. 16, 18)
Week
7: finish chap. 4 & 6 (Feb. 23, 25)
Week
8: midterm (March 1, 3) Midterm 2 (Tues., March 1) No Class, Thurs., March 3.
Week
9: start chap. 5 (March 15, 17)
Week
10: finish chap. 5 (March 22, 24) Midterm 3
Week
11: midterm, start chap. 7 (March 29, 31) Midterm 3 (Tues., March 29)
Week
12: chap. 7 (April 5, 7)
Week
13: (April 12, 14) No class, Tuesday,
April 12
Week
14: finish chap. 7 (April 19, 21).
Week
15: to be determined, exam (April 26, 28) Optional Final Exam time (Tues.,
April 26, in class). No Class, Thurs.,
April 28.
Final Exam: Wednesday, May 4,
1:00-3:00 PM (same class room)
Tips for Writing a Philosophy Paper
The main point of most undergraduate philosophy papers is to present positions backed by reasons and arguments. Even if you are simply giving a philosopher's views on an issue, you need to be able to present the arguments he or she relied on. Indeed, mere opinions, whether your own or those of a well-known philosopher, are worthy of a serious hearing only when backed by reasons.
Thus a philosophy paper is not just a series of opinions spouted by its author, nor a straightforward reporting of events, nor a "book report" or capsule summary of some famous person's views. It involves giving, and weighing, arguments. If this seems intimidating, you should know that there are some easily understood tips and techniques for writing philosophy papers. They do not eliminate the work involved in writing the paper–nothing will do that for you–but they can help you systematically approach your topic. And with enough practice, you will find yourself applying them almost automatically. (Incidentally, the plain fact is that most people who are good at this kind of thing were not born that way, but got that way by practice.)
Getting started.
A common mistake made by undergraduates is choosing a very large topic, one that calls for much more discussion than can be provided in a paper of six, eight, or even twelve pages. In general, it is better to say a lot about a narrow topic, than to say a little about each aspect of a broad topic. (Thus, for example, it is more productive to discuss in detail a single argument for the existence of God, like the Argument from Design, than to run quickly but superficially over the many different arguments for the existence of God.)
Once you have found a suitable topic, formulate to yourself a claim about it that you wish to defend. For example, if your topic is the Argument from Design, then your claim might be that this argument does not succeed in establishing God's existence. Or, if your topic is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, your claim might be that Locke was right about this distinction, and that Berkeley, who disagreed with Locke, was wrong.
Once you have formulated your claim, try to think of arguments that support it, and also arguments that seem to undercut it. This sounds hard, but recall that, if your topic was discussed in your philosophy class in the first place, then probably there was also some discussion of arguments for it or against it. Moreover, it is perfectly acceptable to use arguments drawn from other philosophers. You must, however, show that you understand these arguments and are not just "parroting" someone, and you must acknowledge your source for the argument. Failure to credit sources properly is plagiarism, and will result in a failing grade for the course.
One of the most impressive things you can do in a paper, besides giving good arguments in support of your claim, is to anticipate objections (the "arguments that seem to undercut it," mentioned above), and to show that they do not succeed. Moreover, it is a grave error to ignore or overlook undercutting arguments that have actually been presented in your class or in assigned readings. If you disagree with them, you should say why; but to simply omit them is to ask for a bad grade.
As for evaluating such supporting and undercutting arguments, that is a skill that cannot be imparted here in a paragraph or two. The way to learn it is to see how others do it (particularly in class, but also in philosophy books and articles), and to try to do it yourself. Some of the appropriate techniques are: (1) to assess whether the argument uses key terms properly; (2) to see whether the argument rests on one or more premises that are questionable; and (3) to see whether the argument, if accepted, leads to consequences which do not square with known facts or credible theories.
Showing understanding.
How do you show that you are not just "parroting" someone? The main way is to put things in your own words. It is all too easy to think that you understand something just because you can regurgitate some buzzwords. Real understanding typically goes hand in hand with formulating things for yourself, in your own words. Several rules of thumb are helpful here. One is to avoid jargon where possible; if you must use it, be sure to give a definition. Jargon, for our purposes, is wording that rarely or never arises in ordinary conversation, or that is being used in some non-ordinary way. Another rule of thumb is to write as if you were explaining something to someone who is intelligent, but is not a specialist in the subject, e.g. a favorite grandparent. Do not, in particular, write with jargon in the hope that your professor will like it better or will understand it better (even if you don't).
Another key technique for achieving, and showing, understanding is to come up with your own examples to illustrate key points. Many philosophical positions, though highly abstract and general, readily lend themselves to concrete illustrations. For example, Hume's ethical claim that no `ought' can be derived from an `is', comes alive when fleshed out as the claim that nowhere among the facts about what happens when I cut off Joe's head is there anything that tells me whether I ought not to cut off his head. (Hume himself knew this, of course; indeed, he gives even more hair-raising examples.)
Note, however, that examples illustrate and hence clarify, but that they do not take the place of arguments. Thus you still need to be able to explain the underlying principles in words–you still need to be able to explain why the example is an example.
Finally, do not leave things unclear or make sloppy statements and then say to the professor, "Aw, c'mon, you know what I meant!" Your professor can't read your mind, and will probably assume from previous experience with other students that you yourself do not know what you mean. The safest course is, naturally enough, to say just what you mean.
Writing with clarity.
It is crucial, not just to have something to say, but to say it effectively. The most effective presentation usually follows the old saying: "Tell 'em what you're gonna tell 'em; tell 'em; then tell 'em what you told 'em." That is, begin with an introductory paragraph in which you say what you take yourself to be doing in the paper; then, after you have presented your case, close with a conclusion which says what you have done. If you do not say up front, in the introduction, what you will be doing in the body of the paper, your reader will probably conclude that you do not know what you are up to in your paper. (This is an all-too-frequent situation, especially for students who put off papers until the last minute.)
This does not mean that you must write your introduction first. On the contrary, it is typically better to launch into writing the body of the paper first, since the writing process often brings insights and changes of opinion that you didn't expect. So it is prudent to wait until you are happy with the body of the paper, and then go back and write an introduction that spells out in a nutshell what you are doing in the body. The same goes for the conclusion, of course.
You may be tempted to avoid "tipping your hand" at the beginning of your paper, so that your reader is led suspensefully and dramatically to the eventual unveiling of your key points. Avoid this temptation. It is much more difficult to pull off than you might imagine, and your reader will appreciate much more the up-front approach, pedestrian as it may seem.
A final point about introductions and conclusions is that they should not include grandiloquent phrases. Avoid saying things like, "Throughout history, people have struggled with the question of what makes an action good," or "Aristotle was the greatest philosopher who ever lived, and his influence is still being felt today." Your reader, far from being impressed, will be thinking, "Cut to the chase." Remember, you're not actually writing for your grandparent; you should merely put things as clearly and simply as if you were.
Structure and grammar.
Proper structure at all levels of your paper will help immensely in getting your points across. Choose words in a way that avoids ambiguity. For example, if you use the word "it", be sure that it is clear to which "it" you are referring. It can help to have a friend read your paper, looking for ambiguities that you might have overlooked. Likewise, you should avoid run-on sentences or incomplete sentences, which can be very confusing to read.
Class Notes (Introducing Philosophy, R. Solomon, 10th
Ed.)
INTRODUCTION
Know the following
definitions:
argument, premises, syllogism
logic, rhetoric
Inductive arguments,
Deductive arguments
argument by analogy (an inductive
argument)
valid, sound
necessary and sufficient
conditions
reductio ad absurdum
fallacies, begging the
question, slippery slope
Argument from Ignorance
(fallacy): ÒYou havenÕt disproven X, therefore I have a reason to believe that X
is trueÓ—but, just because something hasnÕt been disproven, that doesnÕt
mean that it is true (or, the fallacy can read: You havenÕt proven X, therefore
I have a reason to believe that X is false).
Law of Non-Contradiction
(which is one of the basic Òlaws of thoughtÓ): Nothing can have a property and
lack it at the same time and in the same way (or something canÕt be both A and
not A at the same time, and in the same way). If the law of non-contradiction
were false, then how could you survive (or even act)? A car approaching you
would, if the law were false, be both coming and not-coming, so you would step
out into the street and get run over!!!
Truth
Objective
truth: there is one truth that is the same for all. That is,
things/facts/truths are a certain way regardless of what, or how, we think
about them. Reality is thus independent of human thoughts/concepts (at least to
some degree).
Relative
truth: truth is not objective, but is relative to something; e.g., persons,
societies, groups, etc.
Problems
with relativism:
What
can we say about the "truth" of the statement Òall truth is relativeÓ
(or, "there are no objective truths")? Is it objectively or
relatively true?
(i)
If it is objectively true, then relativism is self-contradictory. (Why?: because
the claim is objectively true, and this contradicts what the statement
asserts—i.e., the claim states that there are no objective truths, so how
could it be objectively true?)
(ii)
If it is relatively true, then no evidence can support it: that is, whatever
you believe to be true really is true for you (since truth is relative to
individuals)—so why should you accept the claim at all? In fact, why
would anyone try to convince another person of anything if all truth is
relative?
CHAPTER 1: Religion
A. What is Religion?
Know the definition of: theist, atheist, agnostic.
John Wisdom claims that the
essential feature of religious belief is a certain "attitude" that the religious person has toward his or her
surroundings. For Wisdom, the gap between the religious "attitude"
and that of the philosopher or scientist interested in explanation is
unbridgeable, since religious belief is obviously different from the scientific
quest for causal explanations. But should we separate science and philosophy
from religion?
Albert Einstein
argues that the great efforts of science have been inspired by a religious awe
for the complex regularities of nature. He says science itself inspires a
"cosmic religious feeling."
Keiji Nishitani
claims that the distinguishing feature of religion is the personal meaning that
each of us must give to the existence which we share with all other things in
the universe.
B. The Western Religions
1. The Traditional Conception
of God: all-good, all-powerful (omnipotent),
all-knowing (omniscient), and is
everywhere at once (omnipresent).
God's independence from the universe He created is the transcendence of God.
Problem 1: If God transcends
our experience, how can we know that He exists at all?
Problem 2: Is the Western
conception of God anthropomorphic?
(That is, is God viewed very much like a human being, although stronger,
smarter, etc.?) The scriptural emphasis on God's sense of justice and His
concern for humankind also demonstrates anthropomorphic characteristics.
2.
Can We Know That God Exists?
Three major arguments that
attempt to prove God's existence. They are called (1) the ontological argument, (2) the cosmological
argument, and (3) the teleological
argument.
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
The ontological
argument tries to prove GodÕs existence based on the definition or concept of
God.
AnselmÕs version
of the Ontological argument:
1) God is, by definition, the
greatest conceivable being (GCB).
2) If God exists only in our
minds, then it is possible for there to be a being greater than God, namely, a
being like God that exists in reality.
3) But it is not possible for
there to be a being greater than God.
4) Therefore, God must exist
in reality.
DescartesÕ version of the Ontological argument:
1) God is, by definition, a
being that possesses all possible perfections.
2) Existence is a perfection.
3) Therefore, God exists.
Objections
Gaunilo, a fellow
monk, suggested that AnselmÕs argument could also prove the existence of an
Òisland more perfect than any otherÓ. That is, since the most perfect island
would be lacking something if it didnÕt exist (namely, existence), thus it
would be contradictory for the most perfect island not to exist. (This is a
Òreductio ad absurdumÓ argument, because using AnselmÕs argument leads to
absurd conclusions—namely, that perfect islands exist.)
Anselm replied that the
argument cannot be applied to islands or anything else whose nonexistence is
conceivable. But, Anselm just assumes this claim, and does not try to prove it
(so the nontheist can simply reject it). Charles
HartshorneÕs article make a similar mistake, since a Òperfect islandÓ or a
Òperfectly evil beingÓ is not, contrary to what he claims, a contradictory
concept.
KantÕs objection to the
ontological argument.
The problem with the
argument, for Kant, lies in the argument's central idea: that existence is one
of the essential properties or predicates of a thing, that is, part of its
definition. But existence is not a property and cannot be part of a definition.
"Existence" or "being," Kant argues, isn't a "real
predicate" (such as the predicate "green") because it does not
tell us anything more about whatever is said to have existence or being.
Example: Is there any difference between Òa table that lacks all propertiesÓ
and Òa table that lacks all properties except existenceÓ? If not, then
ÒexistenceÓ doesnÕt add to or modify the concept of the object, and so it is
not a real predicate that can make something ÒgreaterÓ.
Karl Barth argues that the ontological argument should
not be understood primarily as a "proof" of GodÕs existence, but
rather as an attempts to articulate the believerÕs faith.
THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
The Cosmological Argument
relies on our experience of causation, as well as types of beings, in an
attempt to prove GodÕs existences.
AquinasÕ ÒFirst CauseÓ
Cosmological Argument
1) Everything has a
cause.
2) There cannot be
an infinity of past causes in the world.
3) Therefore, there
must be a first uncaused cause.
4) God is the uncaused
first cause.
Problems:
1) The argument does not
prove that the uncaused cause is the Western concept of an all-good, all-powerful,
all-knowing God—it merely assumes it. (Maybe the uncaused cause is a
purely physical process?)
2) An infinite set of past
causes is possible (at least logically). That is, the possibility of set
of causes extending infinitely into the past makes logical sense (since it is
not self-contradictory), and thus it may be physically possible.
3) ÒWho caused GodÓ? If
one admits that there exists something which is uncaused (or caused itself),
why couldnÕt that be the universe instead? An uncaused universe is a simpler
explanation than an uncaused God and a caused world—so, simplicity (as a
guide to theory choice) would favor an uncaused universe as the better, simpler
explanation (theory).
THE TELEOLOGICAL (or DESIGN)
ARGUMENT
This attempt to prove God's
existence argues that the universe shows a design, and thus there must exist a
designer (God).
1) The universe and a watch
are similar in that they are both complex things.
2) The watch is a designed
thing.
3) Conclusion: the universe
is also designed.
4) The designer of the
universe is God (Western God).
St. Thomas Aquinas in his "fifth way"
formulated one classic version of the teleological argument.
Problems:
1) What about plants? Plants are
very complex things, but we know that they donÕt have designers (that is, they
grow and generate on their own without any actual designer going around
and constructing them each Spring and Summer). If complex things, like plants,
can be natural, non-designed objects, then maybe the universe is also a
natural, non-designed thing. In fact, the universe more closely resembles a
plant than a watch (since it was born, is growing, and will die—all
naturally and by itself, without intervention, like a plant).
2) Even if you accept the
argument, it only gives you a designer, and not the Western God. In fact, since
the world is so dangerous to humans, it would seem that the designer is not
all-good (since an all-good God would have made a safer world for humans).
3) Modern science (in
particular, evolution) shows how complex things can come about from more simple
processes. That is, natural processes can explain how complex things and
organisms come about through purely natural causes.
The ÒFine-TuningÓ version of
the Design argument claims that the probability that a physical process could
cause a universe like ours is very low, and thus a designer is needed to
explain our universe. However, the probability that God would create a universe
exactly like ours (from the set of all possible universes) is equally low, so
there is no advantage to invoking a designer.
C.
Religion, Morality, and Evil
1. Religion and
"Practical Reason.
Kant allowed that belief in
God is a matter of faith, but this is not an irrational belief. Since justice
is not always delivered in this life, belief in God allows us to suppose that
our good deeds will in fact eventually be rewarded and evil deeds punished.
Problem: Most non-believers
are moral, and therefore Kant is just wrong to think that morality requires
belief in a divine judge.
William James
makes the pragmatic argument that believing in God is "rational"
insofar as it doesn't conflict with our other beliefs and if it tends to make
us lead better lives.
Problems: (1) Is the
concept of God such that it really does not conflict with our beliefs? Many
would claim the evidence shows that God doesnÕt exist (i.e., it conflicts with
our knowledge of the world, or the concept is contradictory, etc.). (2) Belief
in God may also promote harmful effects; such as war, hatred, etc. (3) Is it
possible for a person to believe in a claim (such as ÒGod existsÓ) if the
evidence is really insufficient (neutral)? Are you really believing in the
claim, or are you just pretending that you believe?
Blaise Pascal
admits that we can't know whether God exists or not. But if God exists and we
believe in Him, we are entitled to an eternal reward. If He exists and we don't
believe in Him, we will receive eternal damnation. Even if he doesn't exist, we
are still better off believing in God because of the qualities faith brings to
life.
PascalÕs ÒWagerÓ
God
Exists God
Doesn't Exist
Believe in God: Eternal
reward little
or no loss
Don't believe:
Eternal
damnation little
or no loss
Problems: (1) One has to
accept that God punishes non-believers, but many would reject this conception
of God. (2) Would a God who sends people to Hell for not believing really be
happy with a person who believes only because they see a profit in believing?
2. The Problem of Evil (ÒevilÓ,
as used here, means Òunnecessary human sufferingÓ).
If God is all-powerful,
all-knowing, and all-good (just), then how is it possible that there is so much
unearned suffering and unpunished wickedness in the world?
Free-Will Defense:
Humans have the "free
will" to create their own troubles (evil), is advanced by St. Augustine.
Problems:
(1) The free-will defense
doesnÕt account for Ònatural evilsÓ (the suffering caused by nature); rather,
the free-will defense only accounts for Òhuman evilÓ (suffering caused by
humans).
(2) How could God have given
people free will, knowing—as He must have—that they would misuse it
so badly (much like giving a loaded gun to a child, for example)?
Response: God has allowed us moral
latitude to provide a test of our virtue. Counter-response: Is the suffering
that tests human virtue a just system (shouldnÕt God have provided a better,
more just way to test us, and thus not have used the suffering of people to
accomplish this task)?
Knowledge Defense:
The world need some evil, so
that we can recognize what good is.
Problem: God could have
simply given us this knowledge, rather than having to experience it. Also, it
isn't obvious that we need anything like the amount of suffering we have in the
world in order to recognize what is good.
In Buddhism, the problem of evil is avoided entirely, since Buddhism
abandons any conception of an anthropomorphic God. Yet Buddhism retains a
belief in moral obligation and in reason. The highest form of Buddhism
confronts human suffering by working to help others in need: the answer to the
"problem of evil" is compassion.
D.
Reason and Faith
Some thinkers respond to the
problem of evil with the notion of "God's mysterious ways," arguing
that we cannot possibly understand God's ultimate purposes.
Problems: (1) this sets up a
discrepancy between the claims of reason and the claims of faith (ÒrevelationÓ)
that is difficult for many to accept. (2) If God is so mysterious, how can we claim
to know anything about God?
Know: pantheism, deism
Mystics claim that religious
experiences may well be indescribable and incommunicable (ineffable), but that
they convey some sort of non-rational truth. William James argued for this form
of religious experience.
Problem: Is mystical
experience really a from of knowledge of reality? (1) Maybe it is just a
natural experience, and not supernatural? (2) How can you verify that people
have really had these experiences?
E. Faith and Irrationality.
For Soren Kierkegaard, Christianity is based on a series of
irrational paradoxes. And truth for a Christian, therefore, could only be
subjective truth, truth for the individual alone. Reason and evidence cannot
prove GodÕs existence, belief in God is therefore a Òleap of faithÓ across the
borders of rationality and thinking to the passionate life of the fear and awe
of God, with its accompanying spirit of "inwardness."
Christianity, Kierkegaard concludes,
is suffering, the suffering that comes with the anticipation of our own death
and our feeling of smallness and insignificance when we consider the eternal
order of things.
Following Kierkegaard, Paul Tillich proposed a form of
Christianity that gives up the traditional view of God and moves the focus of
religion to purely personal concerns and commitments. For Tillich God is a
symbol of "ultimate concern." The belief in God is now expanded to
represent the fact that one finds his or her existence meaningful, thus making
discussions about the existence or nonexistence of God meaningless.
F.
The Attack on Religion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.
Karl Marx
argues that humans invent religion to escape their intolerable social
conditions, since religion eases the pain of our earthly existence. Once we see
this, he says, we should reject religion as an escape and turn instead to the
correction of those conditions that make such an escape necessary. Problem: not
all forms of religion side with the powerful against the powerless.
Friedrich Nietzsche accused modern Christianity of being nothing other than a
rationalization of the valueless and meaningless state of modern life. Christianity,
according to Nietzsche, had become life denying, rather than life affirming.
Sigmund Freud
states that religion is mere illusion. It is the expression of a psychological
need for a parent figure that we obtained in our youth and never got over.
However, that doesnÕt necessarily mean that God doesnÕt exist.
Chapter 4: Self
A. Consciousness and the Self:
From Descartes to Kant
Descartes: Descartes knows
that he exists and continues to exist as long as he is a "thing that
thinks." This consciousness that allows us to know that we exist composes
our soul, which is a mental substance. For Descartes self-identity depends on
this mental substance.
Locke: Locke believes that
self-identity depends on our having the same consciousness and memories. He
differs from Descartes because he distinguishes between a substance (the soul)
and consciousness. According to Locke, memory provides an infallible link
between what we might call different "stages" of a person.
Two objections: (1) we forget
much of what we experience. (2) Our memories are not always accurate: ÒrealÓ
versus Òapparent (or false)Ó memories.
Hume: Hume concludes that
when we are self-conscious we are only aware of fleeting thoughts, feelings and
perceptions, and that we do not have a sensory experience of the self (as a
mental substance) or an unchanging consciousness. The ÒselfÓ is merely a bundle
of sense perceptions and thoughts. But Hume's argument "I can never catch
myself" relies on a presupposition, he is presupposing that there is a
"myself", or ÒIÓ, to be caught.
Kant: Kant agrees with Hume,
since identity is not found in self-consciousness. The enduring self is not an
object of experience. It is transcendental.
Transcendental: a necessary
condition for the possibility of any experience.
If there was a different self
at each moment of consciousness, we would not be able to perceive anything.
Because we do experience objects, we must assume that we have a unified
consciousness that combines all of these impressions into the perception of
these objects. This is Kant's self.
Soul Theory: Your soul
constitutes Personal Identity (PI).
Problems: How do you verify
that you have a soul? Also, if you switch souls, then you switch PI, but you
would not know that your PI has changed since you have the same mental content
(memories, personality traits, beliefs, desires, etc.).
Body Theory: Your body
constitutes PI.
Problem: Body-switching
cases—where you exchange your mental content with another personÕs mental
content. The problem is that we think PI follows our mental content, and not
our bodies.
Brain Theory: PI follows the
brain.
Problem: What about
split-brain cases? Where is the ÒselfÓ?
The "Ship of
Theseus" example.
There are two theories of the
identity of material objects (which are not "persons", of course):
(1) "same parts" criterion (so the ship that has the original parts
is the ship of Theseus); (2) "continuous history" criterion (so the
ship that has a continuous history as being called "Theseus" is the
ship of Theseus.
B. Existentialism:
Self-identity and the Responsibility of Choice
Existentialists believe that
self-identity, in every case is a matter of choice. The self is created through
choices.
Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre
argued that there is no such thing as "human nature", and what we
are—and what it means to be a human being—are always matters of
decision. There is no correct choice in choosing our self-identity, there are
only choices. On SartreÕs account, each person chooses which facts are to be
considered as essential to one's self-identity.
ÒBad faithÓ is the
possibility of refusing to accept responsibility for oneÕs choices. This
results ultimately in avoiding responsibility for selfhood. Examples: The cafŽ
waiter. The denial of homosexual actions.
C. The Individual and the
Community
Self as social product: The
Self is defined by society, such that we find ourselves acting according to an
identity that was imposed upon us by other people.
Responses to the self as
social product.
a) R.D. Laing looks at this
problem as the cause of some of our most serious psychological breakdowns. We
get the sense that our real selves are known only to ourselves, but at the same
time we do not really exist except with other people.
b) Sartre, Nietzsche, and
Kierkegaard argue that we should break away from our social identities and
develop ourselves as unique individuals.
Malcolm X argues that
African-Americans' self-identities are largely defined for them by American
society in which whites are the majority. Social roles have also been binding
to other groups, like women. Some feminists claim that people can only develop individual
identities if we establish a society without clear social and sexual roles.
Individualism versus the
group: The individualist movement is the mainstream of western thinking.
Problems: We become too
focused on individualism such that personal needs eclipse the needs of the
group, and this can result in the destruction of the community.
D. One Self? Any Self?
Questioning the Concept of Personal "Essence"
The self in literature:
Herman Hesse (in a novel)
presents a character whose "self" is a multiple or pluralistic self:
for example, one ÒselfÓ is rational and well behaved, another ÒselfÓ is beastly
and wild. Human unhappiness stems from our oversimplified notion of self. Why
do we have to regard the self as a single unit? He suggests that it is because
we have one body, so we assume that we have one self.
Feminist notions of selfhood:
Luce Irigaray claims that the
"essential" self is limiting and oppressive, particularly when
applied to women. She claims that there may not be any natural masculinity or
femininity at all in our plural "self".
Eastern religions:
Eastern religions have long
criticized the notion of the unified "self." Some Eastern religions
claim that the idea of the self is just an illusion which one accepts out of
moral weakness or backwardness.
Chapter 6: Freedom
Fatalism, Karma and
Predestination
The ancient Greek tragedies
depend upon fatalism, the view that
whatever a person's actions and circumstances, however free they may seem, his
or her predetermined end is inevitable.
Predestination
is the view that our every action is known, if not also caused in advance, by
God. If God is all-knowing and created the world, then God knew what we would
do—so, how can we be held responsible for our actions?
Determinism, and Freedom in
Practice
Determinism is the thesis
that everything that happens in the universe is determined according to the
laws of nature. The problem is that human actions are also events in the
physical universe. But if human action is just another law-determined natural
occurrence, can it also be free?
Know: antecedent conditions,
cause
Hard determinists believe that we are "matter in motion," physical bodies that
are subject to all of the laws of nature. The philosopher-scientist La Place claimed that if he knew the
location and motion of every object in the universe, he could predict
everything that would ever happen in the universe, including everything that we
would ever do (since humans are material and thus subject to the laws of
nature).
Problem: ÒBut, it doesnÕt
seem as if my actions are determined. Rather, my actions seem free.Ó This is
the argument most often used against determinism—but, just because
something ÒseemsÓ to be a certain way, that doesnÕt guarantee that it really is
that way.
Indeterminism
claims that not every event has a cause, which leaves room for free will.
Indeterminists often appeal to modern science to justify their theory. That is,
since many scientists now agree that the concept of "cause" does not
apply to certain subatomic particles, the indeterminists hold that the hard
determinist view is false.
Two objections to
indeterminism:
1) Even if we accept the
conclusions of modern physics, it is clear that determinism is of importance
primarily for macroscopic bodies, and not subatomic particles (that is, humans
and their brains are macroscopic things).
2) Even if indeterminism were
true, indeterminism is not the same as freedom. Freedom means that we are free
to choose what we shall do and that our decisions are effective. Therefore,
indeterminism robs us of our freedom just as much as determinism. If
indeterminism is true, it seems that chance or probability governs our
actions—but that contradicts our concept of Òfree-willÓ.
Most philosophers believe in compatibilism, or soft determinism, the view that human freedom and determinism are
compatible positions. The key to the "soft determinist" position is
that an action or a decision, though fully determined, is free if it
"flows from the agent's character," such that the action is not
coerced or forced on the person. For example, if I am forced at gun point to do
something I donÕt want to do, then my actions are not free (since IÕm coerced).
David Hume suggests that
determinism is necessary if we are to make sense out of the notion of freedom
of choice and responsibility. We can make sense of the notion of voluntary
action only because there is a uniform connection between our motives,
inclination, circumstances, and characters and what we do.
Problems:
A) The coerced or forced
action originates outside of, or externally to, the person, rather than
internally. But in many cases where freedom is most in question, in cases of
neurosis, brain washing, great passion, and chemical "influences,"
the distinction between what is "external" to the person and what is
within his or her character is not clear at all.
B) compatibilism has not
resolved the problem of determinism, it has merely redefined Òfree-willÓ to
allow for us to have free-will. Yet, our actions are still determined, so
free-will is still an illusion.
Because our personality is
determined by forces outside of us and beyond our control (like education,
upbringing, national origin, and gender), philosophers like John Hospers argue that all of our acts
are compelled and not free. Skinner
argues that we have foolishly made a fetish of freedom and we should replace
this with an acceptance of determinism. Behavioral scientists can and should be
given the power to "engineer" human behavior in accordance with an
agreed-upon set of ideals (social harmony, individual happiness, and
productivity).
In novels from George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, and Anthony
Burgess, a determinist view of human nature is attacked, since it is seen
as potentially creating the basis for oppresive societies. A similar argument
is made by Catherine MacKinnon, who
claims that advertisers, moviemakers, pornographers, and others in the media in
our society make, control and determine men's behavior, making male treatment
of women fundamentally violent.
Harry Frankfurt
rethinks the meaning of free-will and coercion in terms of experience of the
agent. He claims that people are free if they act on their second-order
desires. A first order-desire is a desire towards an object (ÒI desire to drink
the coffeeÓ), whereas a second-order desire is a desire to have first-order
desires (ÒI desire to have a desire to drink coffeeÓ). Frankfurt uses this
distinction to claim that people are not free if they do not have, or cannot
act upon, their second-order desires (and that also explains why we donÕt think
animals have free-will, since they donÕt have second-order desires either).
Two cases: (1) a drug-addict
wants to stop being an addict, but canÕt stop taking drugs: this person does
not act freely because they cannot act upon their second-order desire to stop
taking drugs. (2) The drug addict does want to keep taking drugs: this person
is acting freely because they are acting on their second-order desire.
Radical Freedom:
Existentialism
The existentialists accept determinism in science. But they insist that
even if determinism is true, one must always view him or herself as agent as
necessarily free.
Sartre argues
that we are always absolutely free. This means that insofar as we act, our
decisions and our actions cannot be viewed as having any causes whatsoever. We
are "condemned to be free." Desires may enter into consideration, but
only as a "consideration" because we can always act against a desire.
There is no escape from freedom or responsibility.
Chapter 5: Mind and Body
A. What is Consciousness?
Dualism: mind and body are
different substances. Substances are independently existing things that can exist
apart from other substances. So, the mind can exist separate from the body, and
the body can exist apart from the mind. For Descartes, the defining property of
mind (soul) is thought, and not extension in space, whereas the defining trait
of body is to be extended in space.
Problem with dualism: (1) How
can two different substances causally interact? If they are so different, then
how can minds control your body, and visa versa? (2) It is often claimed that
minds have no spatial location, but our modern understanding of the mind often
localizes mental functions to parts of the brain. (3) It is hard to describe
the mind, and biological and material facts about the brain are needed to fully
explain the mind, so maybe the brain is all there is, and the mind is just the
operation of the brain.
B. Alternative Versions of
Dualism.
Causal Interactionism: mind
and body interact—but how?
Parallelism (Leibniz): mind
and body are coordinated so that it seems as if they causally interact, but
they really do not. Problem: you would seem to need a God to set up this
system, but that means you first need to prove that God exists (which may be
impossible). Also, this whole system seems far-fetched.
Dual Aspect Theory (Spinoza):
mind and body are two aspects of the same thing, such that this same thing can
be viewed from two different perspectives (as either mind, or as body).
Problem: What is the ÒthingÓ that underlies both body and mind? It would seem
that the body (brain) is the most basic thing, and not something at a deeper
level of reality.
C. Rejecting Dualism:
Epiphenomenalism: the body
(brain) causes the mind, but the mind does not causally effect the body (so the
mind can be ignored in understanding the brain).
Behaviorism (B. F. Skinner):
mental events (thoughts, sensations, etc.) cannot be verified through
publically observable tests, so they should be rejected. Problem: this seems
much too strong, since it is obvious that we have mental states.
Logical Behaviorism (G.
Ryle): mental terms are defined using a dispositional account of human
behavior. The causal interaction between mind and body is replaced by a causal
interaction between a physical state (a disposition to behave in a certain way)
and the actual behavior (the acting upon that disposition). Example: ÒpainÓ is
Òa disposition to jump around and yell if stuck with a pinÓ (and, similarly,
love, anger, etc., are defined as what people will do if they have those
traits). Problem: you can have the mental event (say, pain) without the behavior
(jumping around and yelling, etc.) normally associated with that mental event,
thus pain is not the same thing as the behavior we display when in pain.
Identity Theory: mental events
are identical to brain events. Problem: ÒI see a red objectÓ is not the same
thing as Òa brain event occurs (when I look at a red object)Ó, but, if the
brain events and mental events are identical, then the two should have the same
meaning. Counter-reply: the identity is not logical, but metaphysical (i.e.,
identical in what exists).
Eliminative Materialism:
mental events are brain events, but there does not need to be an identity
between brain events and mental events.
ChurchlandÕs three arguments
against Folk Psychology (which is the common view that our mental states are
the cause of our bodily behavior): (1) the explanatory and predictive failure
of folk psychology; that is, that folk psychology cannot explain the basic
facts of the mind and brain (such as sleep, learning, memory, etc.). (2) folk
psychology cannot explain why damage to the brain impairs or damages mental
function. (3) folk psychology has never been challenged by a better theory
since the brain is such a difficult object to study (and we have only recently
begun to study the brain).
Arguments against Eliminative
Materialism: (1) introspection seems to confirm that mental states are real;
that is, when I examine the contents of my mind, it seems that my thoughts and
sensations are real, and not brain events. Counter-reply: just because
something seems to be the case does not mean that it is the case (example: it
seemed to the Ancients that the earth was at rest, but that is not true given
our modern understanding). (2) maybe mental states will not be eliminated, but
simply changed to a better conception more adequate to brain science.
Functionalism: minds are not
produced by the kind of material (brains), but by the relations between the
parts of the material. Example: computer parts arranged in the right way may
give rise to minds. Functionalism holds that it is the relations among the
parts of the material thing (hardware) that gives rise to the mind (as the
program or software), and so functionalism holds out the hope that other beings
or computers can give rise to the same mental content (beliefs, pains, etc.).
This is called Òmultiple realizabilityÓ.
Problems for Functionalism
(J. Searle): (1) the brain is not just a computer, and the mind is not a
program: the material of the brain determines the mental properties of the
brain. (2) the ÒChinese RoomÓ Argument: manipulating the rules of a language is
not the same thing as understanding the language, Thus, having the right output
behavior given a certain input stimulus is not a guarantee that the being has
consciousness.
Connectionism: functionalism
is a top-down, software strategy of explaining the mind that does not do
justice to the complexity of the brain, the hardware. Connectionists claim that
the mechanical and physical interactions that occur in the brain determine
human behavior, so just switching the brain for a different type of hardware
will not work.
D. Problems of
Consciousness.
Do we have immediate, certain
knowledge of the contents of our minds (known as ÒincorrigibilityÓ)? Answer:
probably not, because we can be fooled by experience (example: expecting a hot
sensation, and then momentarily confusing a cold sensation for a hot
sensation). Also, what about the ÒunconsciousÓ, which is mental content (drives,
beliefs, etc.) that is unknown to the mind?
Privileged Access: only the
individual knows the content, character, and qualities of their own mental
states.
T. Nagel: we can never know
what it is like to be a bat.
C. McGinn: consciousness is a
mystery.
William James: consciousness
is dispensable, since there is no such entity.
Chapter 7: Ethics
Moral Philosophy (Ethics):
The study of moral concepts, and the rules for right actions, and the
prohibition against wrong actions.
Morality is concerned with
what ÒoughtÓ to be the case, and not what ÒisÓ the case.
ÒRightÓ actions (permissible
to do) are either ÒoptionalÓ or ÒobligatoryÓ (you must do it). ÒWrongÓ actions
are those you must not do.
Teleological
(consequentialist) ethical theories: The rightness or wrongness of an action
depends on the consequences of the action.
Deontological
(non-consequentialist) ethical theories: The rightness or wrongness of an act
does not depend on the consequences of the action but on some intrinsic quality
of the action.
What is the purpose of
morality? To promote human flourishing and the survival of society.
Moral Relativism
Ethical Relativism: There are
no objective, universal moral rules. All moral codes and rules are relative to
either culture, or society, or individuals, etc.
Cultural Relativism:
Different cultures have different moralities. This is not a moral theory but a
fact about different cultures.
Ethical Absolutism
(objectivism): There is a single moral code that is the same for all
people (and thus ethical relativism is false).
A popular from of Ethical
Relativism is that morality is relative to culture or society.
Problems: (a) You canÕt
criticize a culture's morality that you believe is morally wrong—e.g.,
you canÕt criticize the Nazis. (b) Moral reformers are morally wrong because
they go against the group morality—but, we often think moral reformers
are morally right. (c) What ÒcultureÓ do you belong to? Since we have associations
with many different groups/cultures, and these often have conflicting moral
codes, which moral code should you follow?
Problems with Ethical
Absolutism: Which moral code is the Òone trueÓ moral code? How do we find out
about this moral code? (Where does it come from?)
Ethical Egoism (a Teleological or consequentialist theory)
Psychological Egoism: We
always act out of self-interest. This is a theory of psychology, not of
morality.
Ethical Egoism: The action that
increases your self-interest is the morally right action.
Problems: (1) What is in our
self-interest? If we canÕt make this decision, then we canÕt decide what is the
morally right action (e.g., PrisonerÕs Dilemma). (2) Not all actions are
motivated out of self-interest: e.g., self-sacrifice, etc. This is an objection
to psychological egoism, which is often used to justify ethical egoism.
Utilitarianism (a Teleological theory)
Intrinsic goods: Things that
are good or valued for their own sake, and not because they lead to something
else (e.g., happiness).
Extrinsic goods: Things that
are valued because they lead to other things we value (e.g., money).
Act-Utilitarianism
(Act-Util.): the action that increases utility for the most people is the
morally right action.
Utility: Usually defined as
an intrinsic good, such as pleasure or happiness. Bentham favored
pleasure as the intrinsic good, but this leads to the problem that we should
desire only pleasure, and thus desire to be hooked up to a Òpleasure
machineÓ (which provides only pleasurable sensations). J. S. Mill thought
utility was ÒhappinessÓ which includes more intrinsic goods than mere pleasure
(i.e., knowledge, honesty, etc.).
Problem with Act-Util.: It
seems to lead to absurd moral consequences (which we may find immoral).
Example: A doctor who has to kill one healthy patient to save 5 sick patients.
That is, saving 5 is more utility than saving only 1, so the doctor is required
by Act-util. to kill the 1 to save the 5—and this is an absurd
requirement of any moral theory.
Rule-Utilitarianism: The rule
which increases utility for the most people is the morally right rule. A ÒruleÓ
is a general type of action. So, if the action is ÒI can kill patients whenever
I wantÓ, then the rule that governs (or is presupposed) by that action is Òall
people, or doctors, can kill patients whenever they wantÓ. Now, when this rule
is practiced by all doctors, will utility increase? No, because all people will
fear doctors, which leads to a greater decrease in utility overall (since many
will die of curable diseases, etc.). Thus, the rule is morally wrong, and the
actions that are instances of the rule are morally wrong, too. This shows how
Rule-util. is more effective than Act-util.
Problems with Rule-Util.
1) If the consequences
of an action cannot be determined, then the morality of the action is also
unknown. (This is also a problem for Act-util.)
2) Do you maximize the
distribution of utility, or do you go for maximum effect? E.g., how do I
distribute a million dollars to maximize utility? This is unknown, and thus a
problem.
3) Some actions which
we consider immoral are still acceptable (i.e., morally right) on Rule-util.
E.g., ÒEnslave 5% of the population in order to benefit the other 95%Ó—if
this rule really does increase utility for all the societies that use it, then
it is morally right to enslave people.
Kantian Ethics (a Deontological theory)
Kant did not like consequentialist
ethics since it might lead to immoral actions being sanctioned (as above)
because they have good consequences. Rather, he wanted an ethics based on
reason that would apply to all people at all times (universal and necessary).
Actions performed using the
Categorical Imperative (CI), that is, which pass the test of the CI, are
morally right. Actions which fail the test of the CI are morally wrong.
(The only thing that is good
in itself, intrinsically, is a good will. A good will is one that consistently
wills the morally right action; and the CI tells us what the morally right
action is).
1st formulation of the CI
An action (maxim) which can
be consistently willed to be an action that all people can follow is a
morally right action. That is, if you will that all people do the action, and
this does not prevent you from doing the action, then it is a morally right
action. E.g., can you will that Òall people can make lying-promises (where a
lying promise is a false promise)Ó? Supposedly, if you will that all people do
this, then very soon no one will make promises with other people since
everybody knows that promises are never kept (e.g., by willing everyone do it,
I create a situation where I canÕt do it.). So, by willing that Òall people
make lying promisesÓ, I am simultaneously creating a situation where I cannot
make lying-promises. And, thus, I have created a contradiction in willing, and
thus the action is morally wrong.
Problems with the 1st
formulation of the CI:
(1) Some immoral actions
would seem to pass the test of the CI. E.g., suicide—making it apply to
all people (universalizing the action) does not lead to a situation where you
are prevented from committing suicide, so the action is morally acceptable.
(Many people would find this problematic because they believe suicide is
morally wrong.) Other examples: Òkilling your parentsÓ, etc.
(2) The CI (1st form.) still
has to consider the consequences of actions to determine if the action can be
consistently universalized. But, since the consequences of actions are hard to
determine, applying the CI will often lead to uncertain conclusions.
(3) Since the CI tells you
that an action is always wrong (and it is morally wrong for all people
at all times), the theory leads to absurd consequences—E.g., since lying
is always wrong, if you are hiding a person from a murderer, but the
murderer asks you if the person is in your home, you have to say ÒyesÓ
(because lying is always wrong)!
2nd Formulation of the CI
ÒAlways treat people as an
end in themselves and never merely as a means to an end.Ó In other words, never
use a person to get something. For Kant, humans are beings who have an
unconditional moral value, and thus their moral value must not be violated.
This theory essentially amounts to a Òrights-basedÓ moral theory: that
is, people are born with a "right" not to be mistreated.
Problems for the 2nd
formulation of the CI:
(1) When are you Òusing a
person as a means to an endÓ? This is hard to determine: E.g., does a doctor
use her patients to make money?
(2) How have humans acquired
this ÒrightÓ not to be mistreated? Where did it come from, and why is it
only limited to rational beings (which is how Kant defines humans)?
Divine Command Theory (DCT)
Morality comes from God. So,
following GodÕs commandments is the morally right thing to do. (This theory is
a Deontological theory of morality).
Problems with DCT:
1) Basing morality on GodÕs
commands seems to lead to a very immature and self-centered morality. Why?: since
the only reason you follow GodÕs commandments is because you want to avoid
punishment and gain reward (or, because God said so, and you just trust God).
Thus morality is based on selfish motivations (or the reason for the morality
of actions is not thought about at all).
2) Which God is the ÒtrueÓ
God? Since all religions have different moral codes, you not only have to prove
that God exists, you also have to prove that only your God exists.
3) Even if one religion is singled
out, which religious text, which passage in that text, and which interpretation
of that passage do you choose?
PlatoÕs ÒEuthyphroÓ
argument against the Divine Command Theory (DCT).
Are actions good because God
commands them, or does God command them because they are good (i.e., morally
good)? 2 options:
1) God commands actions
because they are good.
Problem: God is no longer the
creator or foundation of morality but is merely the messenger of morality. That
is, the goodness of actions seems to be independent of God, but then we still
need to determine why actions are good (and the DCT was supposed to have
provided this).
2) Actions are good because
they are commanded by God.
Problem: This means whatever
God commands is good, so if God command that Òmurder is morally goodÓ, then it
is morally good to commit murder! So, this option leads to Òmight makes right,Ó
which many people find morally wrong.
If someone responds by
saying, ÒGod only chooses actions which are based on reason when he determines
their morality," then God is using reason to determine morality. But, God
is then using a process (reason) that must be outside or separate from himself,
and thus we are back in option (1), which has its own problems, of course.
Also, if Ò(morally) goodÓ is
defined as Òwhat God commandsÓ, then the statement ÒGod is goodÓ is really the
statement ÒGod does what God commands.Ó But, this is not what a person intends
to say when they claim ÒGod is goodÓ (which is a statement that provides
real information about God, and not a useless tautology like ÒGod does what he
commands").
Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
Ancient Greek morality
focuses on virtue, which can be defined as admirable human qualities (or moral
excellences). Aristotle's conception of virtue is based on the idea that man is
a rational being. Thus, for Aristotle, virtue is a rational activity: activity
in accordance with a rational principle. Aristotle believes that we fully
exercise our rationality with respect to human actions when we seek the Òmean
between the extremes of the actionÓ. For example, too much or too little
heroism (where ÒheroismÓ is a virtuous action) is not productive for humans,
since it leads to recklessness or cowardice, respectively. But, just the right
amount of heroism not only produces the best results, but will also bring
happiness to the individual and society (where happiness, or ÒEudaimoniaÓ, for
Aristotle, is best translated as Òhuman flourishingÓ). Virtue ethics is more
concerned with developing admirable human qualities in people, rather than
determining whether or not a particular action is right or wrong.